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ABSTRACT
This is a thesis on the political economy of decentralisation. Part one analyses the effects 
of fiscal and electoral decentralisation on the accountability of public officials. Chapter 2 
introduces a model of repeated elections to public office. The interaction between voters 
and officials is seen as a principal-agent relationship. Wfithin this framework, two poten­
tial justifications for political decentralisation are provided. It is shown that voters may 
strictly prefer to limit the funds they allocate to a public office by setting up more than 
one office (fiscal decentralisation). A smaller budget implies a stronger incentive for the 
officeholder to try to be re-elected. The second argument for political decentralisation is 
that splitting up the electorate into homogeneous jurisdictions (electoral decentralisation) 
implies that the voters will tend to have more control over the use of public funds by the 
officials.
Chapter 3 introduces asymmetric information into the model. Officeholders are assumed 
to have better knowledge of the technological conditions under which public funds are 
provided. Asymmetric information gives rise to an information rent for the officials. 
Total information rents can be limited by having more than one bureau and the voters 
using relative performance evaluation for their re-election decisions (=electoral yardstick 
competition). It is also shown that fiscal decentralisation can be beneficial to the voters, 
if they are better informed about the local rather than the federal conditions of public 
goods provision.
Part two studies the political economy of the transition from a collectivist economy to a 
market economy. Chapter 4 develops a general equilibrium model of income distribution 
and risk-taking. The formation of entrepreneurial and working classes as well as the allo­
cation of talent are derived endogenously. In a market economy, no insurance can be pro­
vided due to the non-observability of output (and employment) in private firms. The 
more able and the less risk averse individuals tend to become entrepreneurs. Inefficien­
cies arise due to insufficient risk-taking. A different (second-best) balance is reached in 
a collectivist economy where output is shared equally. In this case, non-observability 
implies that workers will not reveal their talent and managers will not reveal the produc­
tivity of their plant. It is shown that either of the two systems may overall dominate the 
other in terms of the majority criterion or even the Pareto criterion.
Different forms of transition from collectivist to market-based production are considered. 
A total (or "big bang") reform is viewed as the collectivist sector being closed down com­
pletely and all individuals having to move to the competitive sector. Gradual reform is 
viewed as the free migration of individuals between the collectivist sector and the com­
petitive sector. This leads, in general, to a dual economy. A majority of individuals may 
want to leave the traditional sector to try their luck in the modem sector and, therefore, 
vote for reform. Despite this, under both gradual and total reforms, a majority of individ­
uals may ex post regret the changes and vote for a return to the collectivist system. It is 
also shown that the majority choice between total reform, gradual reform and no reform 
is always transitive. Moreover, gradual reform is never the most preferred option for the 
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ô time discount factor,
output in period L
üt fraction of funds used for the production of public services in period t.
realisation of the technological shock in period t. 
s public funds.
w private benefits of office.
git cutoff level of output for re-election set by voter i in period t.
Vt value to the incumbent of being in office in period t.
N  number of voters or jurisdictions.
M  number of votes required for re-election.
S  set of voters.
benefit spillover from region k to region n.
Gfi cutoff level of output for region n staying in the federation.
Y measure of technological inferiority of decentralisation.
s critical level of funds, beyond which the bureau's accountability is
diminishing under symmetric information.
a
s critical level of funds, beyond which the bureau's accountability is diminishing
under asymmetric information.
probability of the incumbent being re-elected, in equilibrium, 
o mean-preserving spread on 0^ .
Part Two:
V certainty equivalent 
y income.
Till probability of success for entrepreneurs of high ability.
Til probability of success for entrepreneurs of low ability.
R index of risk aversion.
P(R) cumulative distribution of risk attitudes in the population. 
g firm output.
X variable labour input.
Y measure of decreasing returns to scale.
a  proportion of talented individuals in the population,
e proportion of managers in the population.
G aggregate output.
C collectivist economy (no reform).
CE competitive economy (total reform).
DE dual economy (partial reform).
A set of workers in the competitive sector, 
r  set of entrepreneurs in the competitive sector.
E set of workers in the collectivist sector, 
a  proportion of collectivist sector workers in the population. 
Vq£ entrepreneurial income, in case of success.
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1.1 The traditional theory of political decentralisation
Political science and economics are two closely related social sciences. There exists a 
long standing history of thought on political economy and on economic policy. Yet, it 
seems puzzling that the issue of decentralisation has so strongly dominated economic 
thinking while, until recently, it has received the attention of very few political scientists. 
A related fact is that there have not been many fruitful attempts by economists to under­
stand bureaucracy. Until recently, neither economists nor political scientists have 
directed sufficient efforts towards understanding competitive forces and incentives
within political and bureaucratic institutions.^
This thesis deals with the political economy of decentralisation. The main underlying 
theme concerns the costs and benefits of decentralisation in democratic institutions. The 
arguments I am developing below apply to democratic nation states, but most of them are
1. A notable exception is, of course, the famous Downs-Hotelling model of political competition.
equally valid in the context of other democratic institutions such as corporate firms, 
cooperatives, sports clubs etc.
The motivation for my analysis is based on the following well-known puzzled Take any 
organisation where formal authority is decentralised. Such an organisation will, in gen­
eral, be inefficient because o f different types of external effects and coordination prob­
lems among its units. These in^ciencies can be overcome through an agreement signed 
by all units inducing them to behave ffficiently. Alternatively, formal authority can be 
concentrated on one benevolent centre which directly implements an efficient outcome. 
This implies that, as long as complete contracts can be signed and enforced, an efficient 
arrangement will be found and the distinction between centralisation (where authority is 
concentrated on a central decision-maker) and decentralisation (where authority is con­
centrated on a comprehensive contract and the court which enforces it) is purely seman­
tic.
In a seemingly very different context, a large literature on federalism has been developed. 
This literature, which can be traced back at least to Tocqueville (1835) and the Federalist 
Papers (Madison, Hamilton and Jay, 1787), has tried to prescribe how the functions of the 
state should be allocated between different levels of government. More recent standard 
references are Buchanan (1950), Musgrave (1959, 1961, 1971), Oates (1972), Riker 
(1964) and King (1984).
Several advantages of centralisation (=allocating functions to the federal government) 
have been identified in this literature. They range from increasing returns to scale in the 
production of public goods and services, a need for the coordination of policies and the 
internalisation of inter-jurisdictional externalities, to the view that the costs of redistribu­
tion would be lower under centralisation. More arguments for the superiority of centrali­
sation have been developed more recently.^ It has been argued that central government 
will in general strictly dominate decentralisation since it does not have to respect local 
autonomy: As Klibanoff and Morduch (1993) show, efficient policies in a federation may
2. See Coase (1939) and Williamson (1975). A more sophisticated version of this argument is known as 
the "revelation principle". See Dasgi^ta, Hammond and Maskin (1979).
3. For an excellent optimal taxation approach identifying several sources of inter-jurisdictional externali­
ties and showing how they can be internalised by the central government see Gordon (1980). Inter- 
jurisdictional externalities have also been the subject of the literature on fiscal competition. For surveys 
on the theory of fiscal competition, see l^dasin  (1988 and 1992). Tl% advantages of c«itralisation are 
also reviewed in Prud’homme (1995).
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violate local autonomy, i.e. some regions will prefer to leave the federation rather than 
being part of it under an efficient arrangement. This means that, if centralised govern­
ment is in the position to violate local autonomy while decentralisation (by definition)
has to respect it, the former will strictly dominate the latter.^
On the other hand, several advantages of decentralisation (=aUocating functions to lower 
levels of government) have been identified, such as better matching of services to local 
tastes and incomes or reduced bureaucracy arising from the fact that local government is 
somehow "closer to the people" and therefore knows their preferences more precisely 
and serves their interests better than federal government
Probably the most elegant and most influential contribution advocating the superiority of 
decentralised government has been Tiebout’s (1956) article. As an answer to Samuel- 
son’s (1954) seminal paper, Tiebout developed the argument that profit-maximising local 
authorities would compete for residents who "vote with their feet" for their most pre­
ferred package of taxes and local public services, thereby truthfully revealing their pref­
erences for public services. He showed that, under certain conditions, the resulting
"decentralised competitive equilibrium" is Pareto-efficient. ^  The advantages of decen­
tralisation have lead many people to uphold the so-called "principle of subsidiarity" 
which states that authority should be decentralised to local government, unless there are
compelling reasons for centralisation.^
How does the literature on federalism relate to the theory of organisation and to the puz-
n
zle stated above? In my view, there is a very close connection between the two. In fact, 
the puzzle precisely applies to the problem of federalism, and any satisfactory theory of 
decentralised government should bypass it through a well-founded argument for the strict 
superiority of decentralisation. Unfortunately, most of the traditional theory of federal­
ism does not satisfy this criterion. A closer inspection of that literature reveals that the 
superiority of decentralised government typically relies on either unmotivated or implicit
4. See also Farrell (1987) and Greenwood and McAfee (1991).
5. Tiebout’s argument has been criticised, among others, by Pestieau (1977) and Bewley (1981). Bewley 
demonstrates that Tiebout’s theorem requires extremely strong assumptions, making local public goods 
essentially identical to private goods.
6. On the principle of subsidiarity see Begg et al. (1993).
7. This view has been advanced independently by Crémer, Estache and Seabright (1994).
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constraints on central government. The most commonly imposed constraint is that cen­
tral government is required to use uniform policies throughout the federation, while 
decentralised government is able to implement differentiated policies in a heterogeneous
o
federation.® It is difficult to see why a benevolent and rational government would use a 
uniform policy when such policy is inefficient. Once such constraints are removed, the 
superiority of decentralisation disappears with them.
As a consequence, a literature has grown showing how a benevolent, unconstrained cen­
tral government can always implement efficient policies in a federation; see e.g. Gordon 
(1980), )^^dasin (1989), Krelove (1992), Piketty (1993) and, in a more general context, 
Varian (1992). These articles characterise policies which are designed to internalise inter- 
jurisdictional externalities in a Pogouvian fashion. They make explicit the relevance of 
the aforementioned puzzle for the theory of federalism. Similarly, Tiebout’s theorem is 
not actually about decentralisation. It merely characterises an optimal mechanism for 
local public goods economies. A benevolent, unconstrained centre just needs to follow 
the rule given in Tiebout’s article, namely to maximise profits in each locality, thus
implementing an optimal allocation.^ This illustrates very nicely, how the puzzle directly 
applies to the problem of fiscal federalism. In the following section, I argue that the 
avoidance of this puzzle depends on the view of government one chooses to adopt.
1.2 Decentralisation and alternative views of government
In the previous section, I argue that the traditional literature on federalism lacks an appro­
priate foundation. In this section, I assess two ways in which such a foundation and a 
meaningful trade-off between costs and benefits of decentralised government can be 
established: This is possible if government is benevolent but there exist constraints on the 
possible contracts which can be enforced (i.e. in a world of incomplete contracts). A sec­
ond possible foundation for decentralisation arises if government is seen as self-inter-
8. Other constraints are sometimes imposed on the choice of instruments or (m the information available 
to the centre. For example, even in studies where the uniformity constraint is forcefully rejected such as 
in De Lecea (1983), the central government is imi^citly barred from using intergovernmental transfers 
in order to reveal local information.
9. This interpretation has been suggested by several authors, including Weldon (1966, p. 231), Breton and 
Scott (1978, pp. 40-41), Bewley (1981), Hamlin (1991, p. 195) and Seabright (1995, p. 3).
12
ested rather than benevolent. I review here the recent literature in the light of these two 
types of answers to the puzzle stated above.
1.2.1. Decentralisation with benevolent government and incomplete contracts
In a world of benevolent government and incomplete contracts, the argument used to 
explain the puzzle stated in the previous section does not go through any more, since the 
centre will not always be able to induce efiticient behaviour from all agents as its instru­
ments are limited. In this case decentralisation of authority may be a way to make better 
use of the limited range of enforceable contracts and, thus, decentralisation may strictly 
dominate centralisation.
A very nice illustration of this can be found in Kehoe (1989). He demonstrates that if the 
central government is not able to credibly commit to an ex ante optimal future policy of 
capital taxation, then individuals will save too little. The reason for this is that they antic­
ipate that ex post it will be optimal for the government to tax capital at a very high rate 
since such a tax will {ex post) be non-distortionary. This time consistency problem is 
weakened when fiscal authority is allocated to the local governments, since they will ex 
post not be able to set too high rates as this would erode their tax base (= tax competi­
tion). Thus, the prospect of {ex post) inefficient tax competition makes decentralisation 
act as a commitment to low tax rates and induces individuals to save more. In this manner 
decentralisation may strictly dominate centralisation.
Other models where also a commitment problem (which is a consequence of incomplete 
contracts) provides the foundation for decentralised authority can be found e.g. in 
Melumad and Mookheijee (1991), Schmidt (1991) and Daveri and Panunzi (1995). The 
latter is explicitly embedded in a model of fiscal federalism. The authors build on the 
problem of soft budget constraint introduced by Dewatripont and Maskin (1995): A 
benevolent government must refinance bad projects if the social cost of stopping them in 
a late stage is too high. The fact that government cannot commit not to refinance bad 
projects gives wrong incentives ex ante. Daveri and Panunzi (1995) argue that under 
decentralisation the social cost of stopping a bad project as perceived by a local govern­
ment is lower than the full social cost because of out-migration of some of the unem­
ployed. This implies that decentralisation serves as a commitment to stop bad projects 
and, therefore, hardens the soft budget constraint This leads them to conclude that, with
low mobility costs, decentralisation may strictly dominate centralisation.^®
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Aghion and Tirole (1994) present another argument for decentralisation. It is based on 
the incentive to acquire information. Information acquisition is associated with convex 
costs, so that several agents should participate in i t  But, as neither the effort an agent 
undertakes to acquire information nor an agent’s information are contractible, informa­
tion acquisition is samthing like a public good. The only way for several agents to induce 
each other to acquire information is for them to share authority (i.e. the right to choose a 
policy or project). Under shared authority, more agents will become informed which will
be beneficial to all of them.^^
The incomplete contract foundation for decentralised government is, of course, only as 
convincing as the justification of contract incompleteness. To the extent that the contract 
incompleteness can be endogenised, this approach can provide a satisfactory justification 
of decentralisation. If the endogenisation is not possible or not convincing, then the argu­
ment will be as doubtful and arbitrary as in the traditional theory of federalism.
I.2.2. Decentralisation with self-interested government
Another view of government one could adopt is that it is composed of self-interested 
individuals and, therefore, does not necessarily strive to maximise the welfare of its citi­
zens. They may then be better off under an arrangement where political power is decen- 
ralised. This is the approach I am taking in part one of this thesis. I develop a number of 
variations on the theme that fiscal and electoral decentralisation may improve the per­
formance of self-interested, elected officials. My model captures the idea that local gov­
ernment serves the interest of its citizens better, because it is better controlled by them. 
The interaction between voters and officials is seen as a principal-agent relationship. In 
chapter 2 ,1 show that voters may prefer to strictly limit the funds they allocate to one 
office in order to give the officeholder a stronger incentive to try to be re-elected. A sec­
ond argument for decentralisation is that splitting up the electorate into homogeneous 
jurisdictions (=electoral decentralisation) eliminates the possibility of officeholders to 
play off the voters against each other. In chapter 3 ,1 show that voters can set up a bene-
10. Qian and Roland (1994) also develop a model where decentralisation serves to harden the budget con­
straint of firms.
II. A closely related argument can be found in Crémer (1992). Another type of incomplete contract argu­
ment for decentralisation, developed by Melumad, Mookheqee and Reichelstein (1992a and 1992b), is 
based on what these authws call "limited communication". As I explain in section 1.4, below, the gen­
eral equililxium model developed in part two of this thesis also uses an incomplete contract foundation 
for decentralisation.
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ficial competition among officeholders and thus reduce the latter *s information rents 
compared to centralisation.
My results can be seen in the tradition of the early models of self-interested government 
developed by Brennan and Buchanan (1980) or Niskanen (1971). This literature, how­
ever, uses ad hoc assumptions which immediately imply the superiority of decentralised 
government. Brennan and Buchanan (1980), for example, assume that government offi­
cials use an exogenously fixed fraction of the public funds under their responsibility for 
private purposes. The authors do not explain how this can actually be the outcome of 
political competition in a democracy. Niskanen (1971) and many others build on the so- 
called Leviathan hypothesis, which assumes that the government’s objective is to max­
imise its own revenue. Again, this assumption is usually not derived from individually 
17rational behaviour. The model developed in part one of this thesis is consistent with this 
type of government behaviour, but derives it as the equilibrium of a game of repeated 
elections. In this sense one could interpret the analysis as a "micro foundation" of the 
public choice argument for decentralised government. Here government behaviour is 
explained in terms of individually rational decisions. This means that the advantages of
decentralisation are derived endogenously.
1.3 Overview of part one
Part one of this thesis is a contribution to the theory of elections with self-interested pol­
iticians. If one believes that politicians are driven by the same motives as other members 
of society, then one is immediately confronted with the following question: What induces 
politicians to pursue social goals and to use public funds for public rather than for their 
own purposes? I explore the view that politicians enjoy monetary and non-monetary ben­
efits of being in power. Their motivation to use at least some of the public funds for social
12. The hypothesis of revenue maximising Leviathan government has been tested empirically in a number 
of studies, without a clear conclusion. See Oates (1985), Eberts and Gronberg (1988), Zax (1989), and 
Heil (1991).
13. There exists a growing literature supplying a game theoretic treatment of democratic institutions. 
Recent contributions include Romer and Rosenthal (1979 and 1995), Brams and Fishbum (1983), Mye- 
rson (1993a and b), Baron and Mo (1993), Londregan and Romer (1993) and many others. With the 
exception of Romer and Rosenthal (1995), none of these contributions deals with the issue of decentral­
isation.
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goals is derived from their desire to be re-elected. They seek to be re-elected in order to 
be able to enjoy also the benefits of being in office in future periods.
In chapter 2 ,1 develop a model of repeated elections that derives the degree of electoral 
accountability as a political equilibrium. The approach taken here also departs from the 
traditional theory of electoral competition where political platforms are determined 
before the election. I take the point seriously that, once elected, politicians cannot be 
forced to keep their promises made during the election campaigns. Under these condi­
tions, political platforms and pre-election announcements should be seen as empty prom­
ises. I am building on Ferejohn's (1986) model of electoral control. The policy outcomes 
are described as a subgame perfect equilibrium of a game between voters and politicians, 
where only credible strategies are relevant.
>Mthin this framework, I show that fiscal and/or electoral decentralisation may increase 
the accountability of elected officials, as reflected by the fraction of funds they use for the 
provision of public services. One implication of this approach is that, if voters realise that 
part of the public funds is going to be misallocated, they will vote for lower taxes com­
pared to the first-best with benevolent government Moreover, it follows that decisions 
concerning political centralisation or decentralisation should not be left to the politicians, 
since the latter would choose too much centralisation. This is not in contradiction to the 
Leviathan hypothesis, but it is derived from first principles.
1.4 Overview of part two
The puzzle stated in section 1.1 is also valid in the context of competitive general equi­
librium theory. After the famous Lange-Lemer controversy^^ in the 1930 which is at the 
roots of modem mechanism design, we know that with complete and competitive mar­
kets general equilibrium theory does not say anything about the allocation of authority in 
the economy, i.e. it is "institutionally empty". In part two of this thesis, I use a competi­
tive general equilibrium model of a private goods economy with endogenous firm forma­
tion. The economy is, however, constrained by the fact that the output produced by any 
production unit is not verifiable. This imperfection leads to incomplete markets and a 
problem of social insurance which is solved differently under different allocation sys-
14. See Lange (1936) and Lemer (1936).
16
terns. I compare a decentralised competitive economy with a missing insurance market to 
a centralised collectivist economy. Due to the non-observability of firm output, the prob­
lem is not institutionally empty. On the basis of the same fundamentals (i.e. individual 
preferences and endowments, technologies and information structure), I show that the 
two systems yield very different allocations. Either of the two systems may dominate the 
other in terms of the majority criterion or even the Pareto criterion.
)\^thin this economic environment, I study the politics of transition. Starting from collec­
tivist economy, society has a choice between total reform, gradual reform and no reform. 
Under total reform, the collectivist sector is closed down and all individuals have to take 
part in production within the new, competitive sector. Some will choose to become entre­
preneurs and employ the others on a competitive labour market. Under gradual reform, 
individuals have the choice whether to remain in the collectivist sector or to move to the 
competitive sector. In general, this results in a dual economy, with some individuals 
being employed in each sector. I show, however, that gradual reform can never be the 
democratic outcome. This interesting result has several important implications which I 
discuss in chapter 4 .1 argue there, that these findings can be used to explain some recent 
experiences of transition economies, such as
(i) the political polarisation between pro-reformers and conservatives, and
(ii) the democratic return to power of conservatives after only one term with reformers 
in power.
Although the two parts of this thesis use very different approaches, they are both the 
result of an attempt to join economic and political thoughts within one formal analysis. 
Since theoretical work in this area has been surprisingly scarce, I hope that this thesis is 




ELECTORAL CONTROL AND DECENTRALISATION
UNDER SYMMETRIC INFORMATION
2.1 Introduction
The main objective of this chapter is to show how decentralisation affects the degree of 
electoral control in a democracy. It is widely believed that democracy is a good way of 
controlling rulers. This belief is usually based on the view that the democratic decision 
process has essentially two major virtues: First, electing candidates on particular plat­
forms seems to result in "satisfactory" or "acceptable" outcomes of the group decision 
process. It allows all members of society to contribute to the collective choice and is 
likely to produce political stability. There exists, of course, a vast literature on this aspect
of democracy. ^
A second virtue of democracy lies in its ability to limit the discretion of public office-
holders. This aspect has received much less attention in the literature so far. The process 
of repeated elections gives the voters an instrument to discipline politicians and public
19
officeholders. The basic tool is that an incumbent who wants to be re-elected has to act 
(at least to some extent) in the interest of her electorate. Otherwise, at the next election, 
another candidate will be elected. The model of repeated elections developed below rep­
resents the public sector in a democracy as an organisation whose beneficiaries have the 
authority to elect their agents, i.e. the voters are principals and the government officials
are agents. Voters pay taxes and expect a return in the form of a certain qualitative or 
quantitative level of public services. Incomplete contracts prevail in the sense that it is 
not possible for all the voters and bureaucrats to write an enforceable contract specifying 
an optimal reward structure for the officeholder as a function of the level of output(s) pro­
duced. I show how decentralisation may improve the accountability of elected officials 
and thus strictly dominate centralisation, from the point of view of the voters.
I introduce the distinction between fiscal and electoral decentralisation. Fiscal centrali­
sation corresponds to a situation where all public funds are managed by a single bureau. 
In contrast to this, xxntisifiscal decentralisation the budget is split and public services are 
produced by several offices. Under fiscal decentralisation the political system may be or 
not be decentralised. Electoral decentralisation means here that the electorate is split into 
several groups (or jurisdictions) electing their own officials. The two arguments devel­
oped in this chapter can be summarised as follows:
(i) Public officials want to be re-elected in o der to enjoy the monetary and (more 
importantly) the non monetary, private benefits of being in office in future periods. This 
constitutes an incentive for them to limit the amount of public funds they use for their 
own purposes. Under fiscal decentralisation, private benefits are more important relative 
to the public funds under the control of a single officeholder. Therefore, from the point of
1. "Political stability" here is understood in the sense that no new majority of voters will form to overrule 
the outcome. The median voter theorem states that, if voters have single-peaked preferences over the 
possible policies, there exists a plan which will win the vote under majority voting and there will be no 
other majority opposed to it. The issue of stability in election outcomes is less straightforward if one is 
not willing to restrict attention to single-peaked preferences and uni-dimensional decisions. For a sur­
vey of the literature on the stability of voting equilibria, see e.g. Coughlin (1990) or Mueller (1990).
2. There is now a growing literature on repeated elections, trying to fill the gap: see Ferejohn (1986), Lott 
and Reed (1989), Austen-Smith and Banks (1991), Banks and Subramanian (1993), Harrington (1993), 
Myerson (1993a), and others. See also Barro (1973) and Migué and Bélanger (1974) for earlier work in 
this direction.
3. Everything said here does, in principle, ^ p ly  just as well to the relationships between shareholders of a 
corporate firm and the CEO, or between lenders and sovereign borrowCTS. Related models on repeated 
lending have been developed by Allen (1983), Bolton and Scharfstein (1991), and Gromb (1994).
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view of the voters, fiscal decentralisation leads to a better use of the private benefits 
which do not cost the voters anything. This, in turn, increases her incentive to be re­
elected, and therefore reduces her incentive to misallocate the funds.
(ii) In a centralised organisation with a heterogeneous electorate and majority rule elec­
tions, the incumbent can play off the different voters in a way which allows her to be re­
elected even if she misallocates most of the public funds. The basic force is that, since 
she only needs a majority of the votes to be re-elected, the officeholder will always 
choose to serve the voters with the lowest demands on her. Therefore, if he wants to be 
considered by the officeholder in her agenda, each voter is forced to keep his demands 
from the incumbent low. As voters are played off against each other, they are forced to 
reduce their expectations from the incumbent such that, at equilibrium, the incumbent 
will always be re-elected without producing any output This result, which I call the Fer­
ejohn Paradox, was first derived in a similar context in Ferejohn (1986, proposition 6). 
My result 4 shows that Ferejohn's analysis was incomplete in the sense that there are 
many more equilibria than the one identified by him, but all equilibria are characterized 
by zero output. The result shows in an extreme form how, under centralisation, the con­
flicting interests (i.e. the heterogeneity) of the principals leads to a loss of electoral con­
trol.
The basic model with one officeholder, one voter, and symmetric information is intro­
duced in section 2.2. Section 2.4 extends the basic model to the case of many voters and 
many outputs and derives the Ferejohn Paradox. In sections 2.3 and 2.5, respectively, I 
develop arguments (i) and (ii) for decentralisation mentioned above. In section 2.5,1 also 
discuss several institutional solutions to the Ferejohn Paradox. In particular, electoral 
decentralisation leading to a homogeneous electorate reduces the possibility for the 
incumbent to play off the voters against each other. This, in turn, means that higher out­
put levels will be achieved under decentralisation than under centralisation. Further 
extensions are discussed in section 2.6.
2.2 The basic model of centralised production
In order to formalise the ideas presented above, I use an extension of Ferejohn's (1986) 
pioneering model of repeated elections to capture the agency cost associated with public
goods provision.^ There is one (representative) voter and several identical candidates for
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one office. Their time horizons are infinite with a constant and common time discount 
factor 5. In each period r, the voter elects one of the candidates to office for that period. 
He (the voter) lends her (the officeholder or manager) the funds s (per period) for the pro­
duction of an output of value gf to the voter, with
ÿ, = a, • 0, • j  . (1)
a  denotes the proportion of funds used "efficiently" and 0 is a technological random 
variable, uniformly distributed on the interval [0,1]. The realisations 0^  are independent 
in each period. Both and are assumed to be non-contractible. In this sense the 
agency contract is incomplete.
The "contracts" between the voters and their representatives are both incomplete and 
implicit (i.e. self-enforcing), so that the voters have to incur an agency cost, even if there 
is no asymmetric information. The contracts considered here are incomplete in a further 
respect. Namely, candidates cannot be asked to pay for the right to be in office. Two jus­
tifications can be given for this: First, given the size of the entire public sector in an econ­
omy the entry fee would have to be very big if it were to change incentives. Thus it is 
relatively plausible that an individual's initial wealth would not be sufficient to pay the 
necessary entry fee. Secondly, Slutsky (1986) shows, within a framework similar to the 
one below, that if voters were actually allowed to charge an entry fee, they would do so 
in equilibrium, and the office would not produce any output It is therefore very likely 
that voters will find arrangements which mle out entry fees. The contracts considered 
here are also implicit, in the sense that they do not commit any party to take an action at 
some point in time in the future which, at that point, will not be optimal. This is equiva­
lent to saying that the outcome is a subgame perfect equilibrium of the game played 
between the contracting parties (see Bull, 1980). Similar reasons that prevent a contract 
from being complete, together with commitment problems on the side of the consumers, 
justify the assumption of implicit contracts.
4. A main difference to Ferejohn is that I introduce a variable size of the budget and consider its effect on 
the bureau's performance.
5. "Efficiently" means here that the funds are used for the p'oduction of the required public services, i.e. in 
the interest of the voter(s). It is assumed here that although could be a vector, oq must be a scalar such 
that the officeholder's allocation decision is one-dimensional. The case where the officeholder chooses 
a vector is discussed below in sections 2.4 and 2.5.
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Throughout the thesis, I am using Greek letters to denote variables which can take values 
in the interval [0,1]- The officeholder's period utility is
w+ (1 -a^)  ' s (2)
where w denotes the private benefits of office. This specification of the agency problem 
is slightly different from the standard effort model where the agent has a disutility of
effort independently of the size of the project. Here a  is a proportion of j;^this does not 
guarantee an interior solution and, consequently, the boundary constraints will play a 
prominent role in the analysis. I believe that, in large projects, the manager's "integrity" 
in allocating the funds is more important than her personal, non-monetary effort. This is 
equivalent to saying that the relevant problem is not whether she works hard or not, but 
rather in whose interest she acts. Therefore, I believe that the resource cost model used 
here is more appropriate in the present context than the effort cost model.
In the symmetric information case discussed here, immediately after the election in 
period f, 6f is publicly observed. I assume that the voter uses a one period retrospective
voting rule (RVRlj^, i.e. he specifies a cutoff level of output , as a function of 0^  below 
which he will not re-elect the incumbent. When is above the cutoff level, then the 
incumbent is re-elected for period f+7. Otherwise, the period t incumbent is voted out of
o
office forever, and a new incumbent takes her place. Since all candidates have identical 
abilities, it does ex post not matter for the voter who will actually be elected. Notice that, 
at the time of his re-election decision for the period t+1 office, the voter knows the real­
isation of the random variable in period r, 8^ . He can therefore make the cutoff level con­
tingent on it.
6. Ferejohn's (1986) formulation is more general and allows for both versions. In his discussion of Fere- 
john’s model, Slutsky (1986), uses the effort model with quadratic disutility. The resource cost model 
used here is similar to the one in Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) and Gromb (1994) where the agent 
reports on the realization of the profits which are not observed by the principal. The main difference 
here to those latter papers is that the principals can replace the agent. Also, I consider only a restricted 
range of strategies; see below.
7. On the concept and the evidence of retrospective voting, see Fiorina (1981).
8. In other words, the voter is restricted to use pure Markov strategies. Slutsky (1986) shows that with 
more-than-one-period RVR's there exist both equilibria where the voter does better or worse than with a 
RVRl. See also Ledyard (1986). It can be shown that the votCTS cannot do better by using a probabilis­
tic instead of the deterministic RVRl.
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Definition: (1-1-equilibrium) A political equilibrium of centralised production with a 
representative voter is a sequence {a^, ^ t -o  ’
(i) the voter uses a RVRl, i.e. in every period t, he sets an optimal cutoff level (as a 
function of 0^ ), taking the incumbent's best-response pattern as given;
(ii) in every period t, the incumbent chooses a , such as to maximise her inter-temporal
utility, taking {gt(^))t=o,.. as given.
The voter chooses strategically such as to provide optimal incentives to the office­
holder. Clearly, the voter would always prefer the output to exceed g^  but he takes into
account that an excessive cutoff level will have the effect that the officeholder will prefer 
not to be re-elected and will enjoy the short run benefits of "shirking". Notice also that
the voter commits at the beginning of the period to the function g^ (0 )^ while, at the end
of the period, he is always indifferent whether to re-elect the incumbent or not, i.e. the 
RVRl is time consistent or subgame perfect. This is because all candidates for office are 
assumed to be of equal ability. The analysis with candidates of different abilities is much 
more complicated (see Banks and Subramanian, 1991).
Result 2.1: The unique 1-1-equilibrium is characterised as follows: In every period t, the 
voter requires output of at least
&/0f) = min[^^s , 0^6(w  + j ) ]  , (3)
in order to re-elect the incumbent. The latter will always satisfy this requirement (and be 
re-elected) by using a proportion
âf = min^l  , (4)
of the funds for production and ( i - â ,)  for her own purposes.
D e m o n s t r a t io n  o f  Re s u l t  2.1: Suppose first that the voter's sequence of cutoff levels, 
g (^0 )^}  ^ , is given. Denote v^a^) = w + {I-ol^s + the value to the officeholder
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of being in office in period t. Notice that is independent of and because of the 
RVRl. Then, the period t incumbent’s optimal choice of is either equal to
= Si /  (0f.s) , which is the minimum which allows her to be re-elected, or equal
to 0. Any other possible choice of cannot be optimal, since it would only entail more 
disutility for the incumbent without affecting the voter's re-election decision. This 
implies that the incumbent will want to stay in office if and only if
>w + s . (5)
Given this best-response pattern for the incumbent, the voter will choose a sequence 
{g.} which maximises his utility. For each period, he will try to set the cutoff
t — 0,...
level as high as possible, taking into account 0^ , and bearing in mind that the incumbent 
will only have an incentive to be re-elected if condition (5) holds. It is in the interest of 
the voter to make it hold with equality. In each period, he will therefore set
«,(9,) = (6)
whereby I made use of the above definition of v^ , together with (5). Using (1), equation 
(6) yields
à, = . (7)
Due to the stationarity of the problem, the value of office, v=v^=v^+y, can be found by 
solving the following equation^
V = w  + [^ 7 -  j 5  + S V (8)
9. The fact that equilibrium is stationary follows from the assumption that the voters use a RVRl, together 
with the stationarity of the environment, i.e. voters and incumbents face the same problem in every 
period.
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which, after solving for v, yields
V = w + s , (9)
Substituting v from (9) into equations (7) and (6) yields the following expressions, 
respectively:
à , = 8 ( ;  + ^ )  (10)
and
g/6,) =e ,6(w + f) . (11)
Equations (10) and (11) are, however, only relevant as long as the boundary constraint, 
a ^ ,  which represents the officeholder's budget constraint, is not binding. Using equa­
tion (10), the boundary constraint becomes
^<LzÈ . (12)
s ~  d
Taking (12) into account, equations (10) and (11) yield equations (3) and (4), respec­
tively, as stated in result 2.1.
The intuition behind equation (9), which states that the (stationary) value of being in 
office is simply equal to the private benefit enjoyed by the incumbent in one period plus 
the value of public funds entrusted to her, is as follows: The incumbent receives was in 
the first instance, v cannot be smaller than this because the incumbent has always the 
option to walk away with was. On the other hand, voters try to keep v as low as possible
by their choice of g . The result is equation (9).
10. When (12) is binding, the stationary value of office is vj/5=w/(l-8).
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Notice that the officeholder's equilibrium “integrity”, , is independent of 0^ . Intui­
tively, this is because the voter takes 0^  into account already when he chooses . He 
adjusts gt such as to require the same in every period.
Equations (10) and (II) reflect that the basic motivation for an officeholder to use the 
funds for production is that she wants to be re-elected in order to enjoy the future benefits 
of being in office. These benefits consist in each period of the private benefits, on the one 
hand, and the misallocated funds, on the other hand.
Not surprisingly, equilibrium output g^  is increasing in 6, w, and s. The comparative stat­
ics of result 1 with respect to the budget size s shows that if the private benefits of office 
w are sufficiently large compared to the funds lent to the incumbent, then the boundary 
constraint is binding and the officeholder has an incentive to use all the funds for produc­
tion. But if s becomes relatively large, the incumbent will be tempted to "walk away" 
with it. Therefore, the voters tend to loose control as s is increased relative to w, as 
depicted in figure 2.1.
1 -Ô
FIGURE 2.1: The voter tends to lose control as the bureau’s budget is increased.
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The same reasoning implies that, keeping s constant, for low values of office w, â  is 
strictly increasing until it reaches the upper bound at â  = 7 . This is shown in figure 2.2.
a ( w )
1-Ô w
FIGURE 2.2: Higher private benefits of office induce a higher productivity.
The comparative statics with respect to the discount factor Ô is also intuitive. For small Ô, 
the incumbent does not value the future much, which - given that the only incentive 
scheme available to the voter is his re-election rule - makes it more expensive for the 
voter to induce the officeholder to invest the funds in his best interest. Clearly, as the 
officeholder cares more about the future - in particular about the private benefits of office 
which she could enjoy - it becomes easier for the voter to control her.
2.3 Fiscal decentralisation I: The role of private benefits of office
The simple framework presented in the previous section shows that, although the produc­
tion technology has been assumed linear, the particular nature of the agency problem
5
results in diminishing returns to scale beyond a certain threshold, s = -— % w , as drawn1 — o
in figure 2.3. This implies that the voter can benefit from splitting the office and electing 
several officeholders independently. In other words, for given private benefits of office 
accruing to the officeholder and not too large values of the discount factor (i.e. 
Ô < j /  (w 4- j) ), the smallest optimal number of offices increases with the budget size. 
The reason for this is that fiscal decentralisation allows the voter to use the private bene-
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fits of office - which represent a cost free means of giving the incumbent an incentive to 
try to be re-elected - more efficiently.
1-8
FIGURE 2.3: Diminishing returns to scale beyond Ô wl(l-h ).
The crucial role of the private benefits is highlighted even more when they are allowed 
to vary with the amount of funds allocated to the office. Keeping everything else con­
stant, one might expect the private benefits of each office to be a decreasing function of 
the total (integer) number of offices, N. This clearly weakens the advantage of decentral­
isation. But, as long as this function, w(N), is not decreasing too quickly, decentralisation 
can still be beneficial. The findings can be summarised in the following statement.
Result 2.2: I f the total budget s is sufficiently large relative to the private benefits of 
office w, and the latter are not decreasing too quickly in the number of offices, then the 
voter will strictly prefer to have more than one office producing the services. In other 
words, fiscal decentralisation (i.e. N>I) is strictly beneficial to the voter if
A^ w(AO> w(i), 3N>I  .
D e m o n st r a t io n  o f  Re su l t  2.2: Denoting s^ the total funds allocated to and the out­
put produced by office n. For simplicity, assume that the budget is split equally under fis­
cal decentralisation, i.e. s^=slN. According to result 1, total output g^  available to the
N
voter in each period (in equilibrium) is %  , whereby g ,^ are determined in the
n -l
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same way as in equation (3) with the only difference that, now, w is treated as a func­
tion w(N) of the number of offices. Total output in period t will therefore be equal to
N
Z  êni = N-min
n=l
(13)
From the first condition stated in result 2.2 (and recalling result 2.1), it follows that total 
output under centralisation will be gf=0^[w(7)+j].
In the remainder of this demonstration, I will show that for some iV>7, which is
equivalent to
N  • min [e^j^,e^0 {w{N) + ^ 0^5 {w(7) + s}  ^ 3N  . (14)
This condition consists of two possible cases:
Case 1 : < 0,5 { w{N) +s^}
In this case, total output under decentralisation is = Qs> 0,5 { w(7) + s} for any
N>1 because of the first condition stated in result 2.2.
Case 2: 0,5^ > 0,5 { w(N) +
In this case, total output under decentralisation is:
770,5 {w(N) +5^} = 0,5 {Nw(N) +5 } > 0,5 { w(7) +5 } for at least some N>1 because of 
the second condition stated in result 2.2.
This shows that, in any of the two cases, output under decentralisation will be bigger than 
under centralisation. □
It is important to notice that decentralisation here simply means setting up more than one 
bureau, elected by the same electorate. This is what I called fiscal decentralisation in the 
introduction, as opposed to electoral decentralisation. The result illustrates one advan­
30
tage of fiscal decentralisation which leads to a more efficient use of the incumbent's pri­
vate benefits of being in office.
Recently, I became aware of a working paper by Paul Seabright in which he studies elec­
toral control and decentralisation using a very similar framework to mine. He also con­
siders incomplete contracts between voters as principals and government officials as 
agents and finds that the latter's accountability can be improved through decentralisation. 
In Seabright (1995), as here, voters re-elect an incumbent officeholder if and only if she
provides a satisfactory level of public services, g . The main difference is that in
Seabright's model, g is determined exogenously whereas here it is chosen optimally by 
the voters as part of the equilibrium in the re-election game played between the voters
and the incumbent.
Result 2.2 can also be interpreted as one of credit rationing. If the repayment of a busi­
ness loan has to be self-enforcing (because of the hold-up problem), then the lender will
not want to extend the amount of the loan beyond the point s = w 5 / ( I  - 8 )  where the 
manager cannot be given the right incentive to repay the full amount. The argument is 
closely related to, but different from, Allen's (1983). There also, the value of being in 
office is non-proportional to the budget size (i.e. the loan size). But in Allen's model the 
reason why the value of office is increasing less than proportionally lies basically in the 
concavity of the production function and not, as here, the presence of the private benefits 
of office.
2.4 Many voters, many outputs and loss of control
So far it was assumed that one (representative) voter was electing a manager who had to
produce a single output. This section extends the analysis to the cases of many voters
(section 2.4.1) and many outputs (section 2.4.2). The framework is thus one of repeated
12common agency with incomplete contracts.
11. In my survey (1995), I compare and relate this paper to Seabright's and to other recent work on the the­
ory of fiscal federalism.
12. Common agency models with comjriete contracts have been analysed e.g. by Bemheim and Whinston 
(1986), Berkok (1990) and Galor (1991).
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2.4.1. Many voters and a single output
Suppose there are N  voters indexed N  who use a RVRl when casting their votes.
This means that each voter n sets a minimum required level of output, , for re­
electing the period t incumbent, taking all other voters' cutoff rules, 
g,7(0 ^),V/e , and the incumbent's best-response pattern as given. £
denotes the set of all voters. Let denote the vector of all other voters' cutoff rules. 
The following definition is a natural extension of 1-1-equilibrium to the case of many 
voters.
Definition: (N~l-equilibrium) A political equilibrium with N voters and M-majority vot­
ing is a sequence of vectors {a^; = o '
(i) e:^ery voter uses a RVRl, i.e. in every period t, each voter sets an optimal cutoff 
level, taking the sequence of vectors o f all other voters' cutoff rules
{ g~  ^(0^)}  ^  ^ ttnd the incumbent's best-response pattern as given;
(ii) in every period t, the incumbent chooses such as to maximise her inter-temporal 
utility, taking { g, (0,)}  ^  ^  ^ as given;
( Hi) the period t incumbent is re-elected for r+7 if and only if the demands of a majority 
of M voters (where N!2 <M  <N) are satisfied. The votes o f all unsatisfied voters go to 
the same alternative candidate.^^
Parts (i) and (ii) are the same as in 1-1-equilibrium. Part (iii) introduces the majority rule. 
The simple majority rule corresponds to the special case of a M-majority rule with 
M=(V+7)/2.
Preliminary result: Denote the M-th lowest component o f the vector
8t = {#7 , . . , } .  A/zy sequence { g ^ /  ( 0 / )  is a N-l-equi-
librium.
13. This definition has a problem, though, for M>(iV+7)/2. It implies that the incumbent will be replaced 
by another candidate although the other candidate may actually have less votes in her favour. This 
inconsistency does not apply when M  ^ (A^+7)/2,
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D em onstration  o f  th is  Result: Consider the problem of a voter for any given 0^  
and ^7” period t. To see that voter n is always indifferent about his choice of gnt,
denote the M-th lowest component of the vector g~^ and = g ^ /  (Q^ s) . First, 
notice that, given the vector ^ is always indifferent between all . This is
because any g^  ^> g^^ will not induce the incumbent to change a .^ Clearly, any 
g^t < cannot be optimal since it would induce the incumbent to choose a , < .
Since this argument holds for any vector g~^ and for any voter the result follows. □
This result shows that, without additional restrictions on the equilibrium concept, no par­
ticular outcome can be predicted. As result 2.3 shows, the following assumption is suffi­
cient for a unique equilibrium. Moreover, this equilibrium corresponds to the one with a 
single voter.
Assumption (gMAX) :
In any period t, it is the case that
= ,mm[e,5,e^5(w + j ) ] ]  ,Vwe S
where g^^ (0^), g (0^), ...are optimal rules for voter n.
Assumption {gMAX) says that, whenever a voter is indifferent between several opti­
mal choices of cutoff level, he chooses the highest of them. However, his choice will 
never exceed the level which the incumbent would be willing to fulfil if n was the only 
voter. This latter level is, of course, the one derived in section 2.2 (equation (3)).
Result 2.3: Under assumption (gMAX) , the unique N-l-equilibrium is the sequence
t = 0 ,...
where = min [7, Ô { i  + w/s}] and g^t = fnin [ 0^ .s, 0^  5 { w + j} ] , for all voters n, 
for all t, i.e., the unique equilibrium is the same as in the case of a single voter.
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D e m o n str a tio n  o f  R e s u lt  2.3: Given the sequence of vectors , the
t = o, ...
incumbent's best-response pattern is now as follows: Set a  = if
+ + + ^  > (IS)
and at=0 otherwise, where /  (0^5) , and denotes the M-th lowest compo­
nent of the vector g^  = (glt.g2ty^--*gNt) •
Consider the problem of voter n in period f, for any 0^  and for any { g~^}
t = 0 , . . .
Denote the M-th lowest component of the vector g~^, and a^t  ^ 8 m /  •
The following three cases are possible:
(1) [ V  » 0/Ô(h' + 5)]
(2) g~(^_j)t<min[QjS , 0^5(W + 5)] a > m m [0^  ^ , 0^6(w + 5)] ,
(3) g~(^_j)t <min[Q^s , 0^ô(w + .s)] Ag^"<mm[0^5 , 0^5(w + j)] , 
where g ^ - j ) t  is the (M-l)-st lowest component of .
In case (1), for any choice of will be greater than mm[0fS, 0^fw-i-5^]. Thus, con­
dition (15) implies that the incumbent will set &^  = 0 , no matter what voter n does.
Therefore he will set g^  ^ = min[Q^s, 0^5(w + .s)], out of indifference (because of
assumption {gMAX) ). In case (3), condition (15) implies that the incumbent will set
» 5 ( 7 +  wA)] , no matter what voter n does.
This is because, for any choice g^^, g^^ will be equal to min [0,5 , 0,5 (w + 5)]. There­
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fore, voter n will again set = min [0  ^  ^ , 0,5 (w + ^)] , out of indifference (because 
of assumption {gMAX)).
A —/I
In case (2), finally, gl^  > miw [0^  5 , 0^5 (w + 5)] implies that = 0. In this case, 
voter M's choice matters. An optimization similar to the one used to derive result 2.1, 
yields that voter m 's  unique optimal choice is g^  ^ = min [ 0,5 , 0^0 (w + ^) ] . Since this 
is true for any voter mg 5, result 2.3 follows. □
2.4.2. Many voters, many outputs and the Ferejohn paradox
So far, was assumed to represent a one-dimensional allocation decision. In this section
the incumbent's allocation problem is across N  different products. One can think of N  
local public goods in N  different regions. It is assumed here that there is one representa­
tive voter in each region. Under centralisation, the N  regions elect a manager to office, 
in every period, and give her the task to produce an output for each region, i.e. a vector
of outputs {g  ^^ 2 ' " ' '  ThG manager receives the total tax revenue s and has to pro­
duce N  different local public goods. The difference to the previous subsection is that the 
central bureaucrat has to allocate the total amount of the funds she uses for production 
(i.e. os) across the N  local jurisdictions. For each local public good, the technology is the 
same as before, with the additional assumption that there is no uncertainty about the tech­
nology, i.e. 0^=7, for all m , for all t. Since this is a model of symmetric information this 
assumption only simplifies the notation. The production technology is thus simply
Sn, = «»<••' > (16)
where is the proportion of total public funds used for the production of the local pub­
lic good in region m . This means that the boundary constraint a^<7 ,V r ,  applies.
14. As shown in result 2.3, assumption {gMAX) guarantees that a homogeneous electorate with many 
voters behaves as a single voter.
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N
whereby a^= ^  . Total public funds are raised from the regions such that,
n=l
N
where denotes the funds collected in region n.
n=I
Section 2.3 focuses on the benefits of decentralisation derived from a better use of the 
private benefits of office. In order to separate that effect from the effect discussed here, I 
will assume from now on that s / w ( l )  < d / ( l  -  b) and w(7) = N w(l ) , for all N.
I.e., the private benefits of office for the central officeholder are assumed to be suffi­
ciently big to eliminate the advantage of decentralisation discussed in section 2.3.
Definition: (iV-^-equilibrium) A political equilibrium with N voters and N services is a 
sequence i n ^ ^
( i ) voters use a RVRl ; i.e. in every period t, each voter sets an optimal cutoff level, ,
taking , for all i s  S \ { n }  , for all t, and the incumbent's best-response pattern as 
given;
(ii) in every period t, the incumbent chooses ^2/ as to maximise
her inter-temporal utility, taking {g.} as given;
t = o,.. .
(iii) the period t incumbent is re-elected for t+7 if and only if the requirements of a 
majority of M voters are satisfied, where M is a positive integer from the range 
N /2  <M <N. The votes of all unsatiffied voters go to the same alternative candidate.
This definition is a straightforward extension of N-7-equilibrium. Notice that now the 
incumbent has also to choose how to allocate the funds she decides to use efficiently 
across the projects, i.e. she chooses a vector a .^ The following result extends proposition 
6 in Ferejohn (1986).
Result 2.4: (Ferejohn Paradox) In any N-N-equilibrium under M-majority rule 
(N/2 <M<N)  , there will be no output from the bureau. All equilibria are character­
ised by zero output and voters being indifferent about their choice of rules. All sequences
of vectors { 0,0 ,... ,0,  ^ ore equilibria, as long as g, is zero in any M o f its com­
ponents. Formally,
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h  = Cj,), Vmej?,, V i : e s ^  Vc^,e [ 0 , H ,  Vf ,
where S  denotes the set of all voters, J. denotes any subset o fS  containing exactly M ele­
ments and %  are real numbers from the specified interval.
D e m o n st r a t io n  o f  Re s u l t  2.4: Since the incumbent only needs a majority of M  votes 
for re-election, (a^^, « 2^,... ) will always be 0 in at least N-M components. Moreo­
ver, the incumbent will choose to serve those M  voters which have the M  lowest require­
ments. This means that, given the sequence {g.} , the incumbent's best-response
t = o,...
pattern is as follows: Set a  = g ^ / s  for all and a , = 0 for all l e S \ d ,
^ mi f It ‘
if
and = 0, for all n e  S  , otherwise, where denotes the set of those M  voters who
are easiest to satisfy in period t, i.e. the voters with the M  lowest cutoff levels g^^
The remainder of this demonstration shows that g/ is an equilibrium if and only if it 
implies = 0, for all n e  S  which, in turn, implies = 0, for all n e  S . Con­
sider any g\ which does not induce = 0 , for all n e  S , and which therefore has
at least N-M+7 strictly positive components. Such a g\ cannot be an equilibrium since 
any of the N-M voters who are not being served could induce the incumbent to serve
them by setting 0< g\f < min [ ] , ^ e , m e  This shows that any equilib­
rium vector gt will be 0 in at least M  of its components. This implies that all voters 
k e are indifferent between any gj^^e [0, oo] . □
15. If there are several sets of M  voters who are easiest to satisfy, then Jt  denotes any one of them.
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It should be mentioned that Ferejohn's analysis is carried out under asymmetric informa­
tion. My result 2.4 shows that the zero output result derived by Ferejohn also holds under 
symmetric information. Contrary to Ferejohn's claim, however, my result shows that 
there is a multiplicity of zero output equilibria (this is true also under asymmetric infor­
mation).
Result 2.4 shows in an extreme form, how the fact that there are many principals with 
conflicting interests gives the agent the power to play off the principals against each other 
and extract the maximum rent The voters' problem is that, if one of them would try to set 
a higher cutoff level, then he would not be served by the incumbent. The latter always 
chooses just a majority of voters to serve, namely those with the lowest cutoff levels. The 
voters will "undercut" each other until their cutoff levels are driven down to zero. Notice 
that the result holds for any majority rule (strictly) between 50 and 100 per cent, i.e. for 
any M in the range N!2<M<N.
The result is also not affected if inter-jurisdictional benefit spillovers are introduced. In 
this case, only equation (16) has to be re-written as
M
Sm =  V +  X  , (18)
m =1
with 0 < < 1 , measuring the degree of spillover from region k to region n.
Replacing equation (16) with (18) means that local public goods are allowed to be impure 
local public goods, excluding only the case of a pure global public good (which corre­
sponds to p^=7). The reader can easily check that, with this re-formulation, the reason­
ing underlying result 2.4 still applies. This is due to the fact that the underlying 
mechanism with regions which are in the minority "undercutting" the regions which are 
in the majority still works in the same way as without spillovers. In other words, even in 
the presence of benefit spillovers, for any voter, there always exists a sufficiently small 
(positive) number |i such that he prefers an allocation with a„=jc-|i and (Xj^ =0 to the allo­
cation and a^=x, for some k ^ n , i o v  any x>0.
The result is, however, puzzling. Although it seems plausible that a centralised bureau in 
a large federation will be more difficult to control by heterogeneous voters, it does not 
seem realistic that production breaks down completely and officeholders use all the funds
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for their own purposes, while being always re-elected. I believe that this result, which I 
call the Ferejohn Paradox, indicates a weakness of the model. In what follows, I consider 
some possible ways of avoiding this paradox.
2.5 Ways out of the Ferejohn Paradox, and the Principle of Subsidiarity
John Ferejohn suggested that, "if the voters agree to utilize expected aggregate output as 
the criterion, they will be able to induce the incumbent to provide the level of service as
was exhibited in section" 2.2, i.e. ^  = & , V f. See Ferejohn (1986, proposition 7).
n  e  5
Such a criterion is sometimes called a sociotropic voting rule (see Fiorina, 1981). But at 
the same time he pointed at the collective choice problem associated with such a voting 
behaviour, namely that "voters will disagree among themselves as to which is the best 
[criterion,] and candidates for their part will try to induce voters to 'defect' from the 
sociotropic voting rule and vote, instead, on a distributional basis." See Ferejohn (1986, 
p. 22).
A second way out of the Ferejohn Paradox was suggested by Steven Slutsky. See Slutsky 
(1986, p. 129). He believes that in reality, for various reasons, the incumbent's payoff is 
effectively an increasing function o f the output. This means that officeholders are some­
how "intrinsically" motivated to act in the interest of their constituents. While this sug­
gestion certainly has some appeal, its relevance clearly diminishes as the size of the 
budget is increased, since then the temptation for the officeholder to choose the short-run 
benefits of shirking becomes more and more obvious. Thus, the forces described in our 
model will still be relevant with officeholders who are partly intrinsically motivated.
While the two approaches mentioned so far both avoid the Ferejohn Paradox by changing 
the behavioural assumptions of the model, I now want to discuss some institutional 
changes which solve the paradox without a change in the behavioural assumptions. In the 
three following subsections, I consider the unanimity rule, electoral decentralisation, and 
the threat of separation, in turn.
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2.5.1. Unanimity rule
The simplest institutional change yielding the same output as in the case of a representa­
tive voter is by replacing the majority rule with the unanimity rule, i.e., the incumbent is 
re-elected if and only if all the voters' cutoff levels are satisfied. Otherwise another can­
didate is elected. This means that the definition of A^-iV-equilibrium is still relevant, 
where unanimity rule is represented by the special case of M=N (see part (iii) of the def­
inition). This prevents the incumbent from playing off the voters against each other 
(since now each voter is pivotal), and the Ferejohn paradox does not apply.
Preliminary result: In a N-N-equilibrium under unanimity rule (i.e. M=N), it must be
the case that gn>0 and àn>0 for at least some n, i.e. the Ferejohn paradox does not 
hold.
D e m o n s tr a tio n  o f  T ins R e su lt: Consider the problem of any single voter (indexed 
n), when all other voters' strategies { } are fixed. If all others would set their
t — 0, . . .
cutoff levels equal to zero, i.e. ^  = 0 , (f e ^  {/%} ) , then voter n would face
i e
the same problem as if he were the only principal. He would therefore set g^  ^ s , 
which is the cutoff rule derived in the case of a homogeneous electorate (see equation 
(3)). □
The problem is still that there exist a very large number of equilibria. At least we can 
make the following characterisation.
Result 2.5: In a strict N-N-equilibrium under unanimity rule (i.e. M=N), all voters will
set their cutojf levels gn such that %  = 7 .
« 6 £
D e m o n str a tio n  o f  R e s u lt  2.5: Consider the problem of voter n, for a given sequence 
of vectors { . In each period t, two cases are possible:
t — 0,...
16. The problem mentioned in footnote 13 also applies to the unanimity rule, of course.
17. Strict equilibrium excludes equilibria which involve choices out of indifference. See e.g. Fudenberg 
and Tirole (1991, p. 444).
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(a) X  Èi t>^s  or
i e S \ { n }
(b) X  g i t ^ à s  ,
je S \ { n }
where à  is derived by a similar argument as in result 2.1 and is therefore given by equa­
tion (4). By the definition of à , case (a) implies that the incumbent will not want to stay 
in office. Knowing this, voter n is indifferent about his choice of . Therefore, case (a)
cannot be a strict equilibrium.^^ In case (b), voter n will set such as to make the
incumbent's re-election constraint
hold with equality, which implies that
(20)
i e  S \ { n }
Because of the assumption made at the beginning of section 2.4.2, that 
s /w( l )  < 5 /  (7 -  6) and w(l)=Nw(N), for all /i, equation (20) implies that
= 5 (^  + 7 ) ^ ' '  - (21)
n =/
Taking into account the bureau's budget constraint, X  ^  ^ 7, result 2.5 follows. □
n G S
18. Since it is assumed here that j/w (i)  < 6 / ( i  -S)  , case (a) would actually also violate the office­
holder's budget constraint and is therefore not feasible.
19. Notice that there exist still an infinite number of strict equilibria, since any sequence 
{ (g / s )  ; (g, )}  satisfying X  “ «f =  ^ , for all t, is an equilibrium.we g
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Since however, in practice, democratic elections also have the purpose of aggregating 
preferences, the unanimity rule will not be a practical solution to the problem. Therefore, 
I now turn to decentralisation as a way to overcome the Ferejohn paradox.
2.5.2. Electoral decentralisation I: The role of a homogeneous electorate
An alternative institutional solution to the problem is that each group of voters (e.g. res­
idents in region n) elect their own officeholder so that each officeholder is elected by a 
homogeneous electorate. Local electorates are homogeneous in the sense that all the vot­
ers in one locality consume the same local public service. With a homogeneous electorate
and under assumption {gMAX) , the voters cannot be played off against each other, and 
electoral control works in the way described in result 2.1, even with many different vot­
ers (=regions).
Result 2.6: Fiscal and electoral decentralisation (i.e. each region electing its own ojfice- 
holder with an independent budget) restores electoral control. All the voters will set their
cutoff levels s^ , in all localities n, in all periods t (where superscript D stands for  
decentralisation).
This result follows directly from the reasoning developed in the previous sections (i.e. 
results 2.1 and 2.3). It shows that local public goods should be provided by the lowest 
level of government which can provide the service. This statement is closely related to 
the Principle of Subsidiarity, which is sometimes referred to in the traditional literature 
on fiscal federalism and in the political debate (see e.g. Council of Europe, 1994). Very 
often, this principle is used ideologically, rather than being derived from first principles. 
Result 2.6 shows that local government can be more productive because it is not able to 
play off different groups of voters against each other. If local public services are pro­
duced at the lowest level of government, the latter will face a homogeneous electorate
which - under assumption (gMAX) - will exert electoral control as described in result
2.3. In contrast, higher levels of government facing a heterogeneous electorate will not 
be subject to effective electoral control, as shown in the Ferejohn paradox. In this sense, 
result 2.6 (together with result 2.4) provides a foundation for the Principle of Subsidi­
arity.
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If a federation is already in place, breaking it up may, however, seem a radical step which 
will probably be associated with substantial costs. The following subsection shows how 
electoral decentralisation may not actually have to take place, if all parties are aware of 
its effects. The mere possibility of regions separating and becoming independent can be 
used by the voters as a threat, forcing the central government to produce a strictly posi­
tive quantity of all local public goods, and thus avoiding the Ferejohn Paradox.
2.5.3. The threat of separation
Starting from a situation where, in period 0, a central government is already elected and 
in office for the whole federation of N  regions, one can ask how much it wül produce of 
each local public good if it has to fear that regions could leave the federation and become 
independent. In this subsection, I consider the case where, after each period t, any region 
may decide to quit the federation at zero cost and elect its own officeholder from period 
t+1 onwards. For simplicity, a region that quits the federation is not expected to ever join 
it again (nor any other federation), i.e. separation is irreversible. All the regions which 
decide to remain members of the federation, cast their vote either for the incumbent or for 
the alternative candidate for federal office. If a majority of those regions votes for the 
incumbent, then she remains in office for the (possibly newly composed) federation in 
r+7. If she does not receive a majority, then a new central officeholder takes her place for 
t+1. Thus, the timing of events within each period is: (1) election, (2) collection of funds,
(3) production, (4) separation or not.
In this subsection, I allow for a more general technology in the sense that the centre may 
have access to a better technology than the local governments (this may be e.g. because 
of economies of scale). The centre’s output is described by equation (16), while the local 
governments have only access to the inferior technologies described by
Snt=y-(^nt-^n » (22)
where 0<y<l.
Under these circumstances, the voters will not only have to set a standard of local public 
services above which they are going to re-elect the incumbent, gn, but also one above
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which their region is to remain a member of the federation, G„. This leads to the follow­
ing notion of equilibrium.
Definition: (N-N-threat-equilibrium) A political equilibrium for a federation of N  
regions and N local public services, with the possibility for regions to separate, is a
sequence { ’>^ 2t * *^2t ’  ^ * such that
(i) each region uses optimal RVRls for membership and re-election, i.e. in every 
period t, each region n sets two cutoff levels, and g^^, taking Gif and g , for all 
i e  S \n  ,for all t, as well as the incumbent's best-response pattern as given;
(ii) in every period t, the incumbent chooses ( ,a 2, , .  ) such as to maximise
her inter-temporal utility, taking { ... ,G^  ^ = o given;
(iii) the period t incumbent is re-elected for t+1 if and only if the requirements of a 
majority of M voters are satisfied, where M is a positive integer from the range 
N /2  <M< N.  The votes of all unsatisfied voters go to the same alternative candidate;
( iv) in period t+1 the federation is composed of all the regions nfor which G„^  < s 
holds.
Compared to the definition of ^ -^-equilibrium, parts (i) and (ii) have been extended to 
include each voter's choice of output requirement, G^, for remaining a member of the 
federation.
Result 2.7: N~N-threat-equilibrium is given by
a„, = ^  , V«, V( A G„, = Vn, Vr ,
i.e. under centralisation, as much output is produced as under decentralisation, despite 
the fact that the centre has access to a strictly better technology.
D e m o n str a tio n  o f  R e s u lt  2.7: If a region quits the federation, its consumption of 
local public good will be = y f^ from period t+1 onwards. Therefore, no region 
will ever accept from the centre, i.e. G^^>y s^. On the other hand, any
Gnt ^  y  cannot be credible (i.e. subgame perfect). Since this reasoning holds for any
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n, independently of what all other regions do, the separation cutoff levels are uniquely 
determined, namely, -  J ^n ’ all n, for all , where T^<oo is the last
period in which region n is member of the federation. Next, consider g^  ^ . It clearly has
to satisfy , for all «, for all t. Finally, a reasoning similar to the one underlying
the Ferejohn paradox (result 2.4) implies that can never be strictly greater than G^, 
for a majority of regions. □
Of course, iV-N-threat equilibrium is characterised by the same kind of multiplicity as N- 
N-equilibrium. I.e., any vector gt is an equilibrium, as long as (i) at least M of its com­
ponents are equal to % , and (ii) G^  ^> y s ^ ,  for all «, for all f.
This result shows that the Ferejohn paradox does not hold when regions have the option 
to quit the federation. Centralisation leads to positive output levels without the need to 
actually decentralise. However, although the centre could be much more productive than 
local governments, it will never be strictly more productive than local governments. This 
can be seen as a version of the Principle of Subsidiarity.
2.6 Conclusion
On the basis of a model of repeated elections that endogenises the degree of accountabil­
ity of elected officials, I have developed two arguments for decentralisation, from the 
point of view of the voters. The model is subject to a number of limitations, some of 
which can be relaxed easily. In this section, I sketch some possible extensions.
First, the crucial variable of the analysis, namely the amount of public funds s, has been 
taken as given. Suppose the voters choose s before the first period. Then s will be deter­
mined by a standard median voter argument. If the control of the bureau is not perfect 
(i.e. a<7), the median voter will react by reducing the amount of funds he allocates to the 
bureau.
Second, I specified an infinite horizon model of repeated elections. Similar results could 
be derived with finite horizon. Finite horizon models of repeated elections have been 
developed e.g. by Austen-Smith and Banks (1989) and Lott and Reed (1989). The advan­
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tage of the infinite horizon version is that it yields a simple steady state equilibrium, 
whereas the finite horizon outcome is driven by the last period effect. In the last period, 
it is clear that the incumbent will misallocate all the public funds. The voter's strategy has 
to be chosen such as to extract as much surplus as possible in earlier periods. A more 
thorough discussion and comparison of the cases of finite and infinite horizon can be 
found in Gromb (1994).
Third, the linearity of the production function is not crucial for the incentive effects. The 
results would be affected in an obvious way, if the technology did exhibit increasing 
returns to scale. The beneficial incentive effects of politicaldecentralisation would, of 
course, have to be traded-off against the technological disadvantage. Similarly, the line­
arity of the objective functions is not crucial either.
Finally, 1 have used a full information model in this chapter. In the next chapter, 1 show 
that the main results developed here carry over to the case of asymmetric information. 




ELECTORAL CONTROL AND DECENTRALISATION
UNDER ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION
3.1 Introduction
In chapter 2 ,1 described two ways in which political decentralisation may be beneficial 
to the taxpayers. In this chapter, I introduce asymmetric information between office­
holders on the one side and taxpayersA^oters on the other side. Government officials pro­
ducing public services are assumed to have better information than the voters about the 
production technology. In section 3.2,1 extend the basic model developed in section 2.2 
by introducing this asymmetry of information. Results 3.1 and 3.2 characterise the polit­
ical equilibrium with one bureau and a homogeneous electorate. Just as in the case of
symmetric information, there exists a critical level of funds, , beyond which the 
bureau's accountability is diminishing so that fiscal decentralisation is strictly beneficial
to the voters. By limiting the size of each office to s<f ^  the voters can make sure that
47
the funds are used in their best interest. However, they cannot prevent the officeholder 
from receiving an information rent.
In section 3.3, comparing the two settings, I find that there is more scope for fiscal decen­
tralisation under asymmetric information than under symmetric information (result 3.3).
This means that there is an intermediate range of the budget size, 5 <  ^< for which 
under symmetric information the use of the funds is optimal while under asymmetric 
information it is suboptimal, from the voter's point of view. The reasoning underlying the 
Ferejohn Paradox (result 2.4) is essentially the same under asymmetric information and 
does not need to be repeated here. The officeholder can play off the heterogeneous voters 
against each other and is re-elected in every period without producing any output.
In sections 3.4 and 3.5,1 develop two new arguments for political decentralisation. They 
both rely on asymmetric information between voters and officeholders. The first reason­
ing is based on the hypothesis that voters are better informed about the conditions under 
which a local office produces the services than they are about he centre's conditions of 
production. This is captured by the assumption that the variance of 0^  is smaller on the 
local level than on the federal level. Section 3.4 shows that, although the technology is 
assumed to be linear and voters are assumed to be risk-neutral, a reduction in the variance 
of the technological random variable, keeping its expected value constant, will increase 
the voters' expected utility (result 3.5). This is essentially due to the fact that a reduction 
in the voter's uncertainty means that in equilibrium the incumbent will try to go for re- 
election more often and, therefore, will produce public services of a satisfactory quantity 
(or quality) more often.
Clearly, the opposite hypothesis, namely that voters are better informed about the centre's 
technology, would lead to a centralisation result. Either of the two hypotheses could be 
justified, although the former seems somewhat more natural. I would like to emphasize 
again that the aim here is not to derive the conclusion that decentralisation is always opti­
mal. The aim is rather to develop the foundations of political decentralisation by describ­
ing some advantages of decentralisation which have to be balanced with all the well- 
known advantages of centralisation.
Another way in which decentralisation can improve the productivity of the public sector 
in the case of asymmetric information is by enabling the electorate to reduce office­
holders' information rents. Section 3.5 shows that under electoral decentralisation the
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voters can use one period retrospective voting rules (RVRls) which effectively set up an 
electoral yardstick competition. Some authors have described such "horizontal competi­
tion" without a formal model. ^  Within the present framework, the voters can limit the 
incumbents' information rents by making their re-election rules contingent not only on 
one office's output but on all observed output levels. To the extent that technological 
shocks are correlated across jurisdictions, this will enable them to induce more produc­
tion from the bureau, despite the information asymmetry. Under centralised production 
where only one office produces all public services the voter cannot use relative perform­
ance evaluation, so that they can only achieve the outcome described in section 3.2.1 give 
an illustration of the working of electoral yardstick competition for the special case of 
perfectly correlated shocks (result 3.6).
3.2 Centralised production under asymmetric information
As in chapter 2 ,1 start with the situation where there is one (representative) voter (i.e. 
principal) and several, identical candidates (i.e. agents) for one office. Their time hori­
zons are infinite with a constant and common time discount factor 5. In each period f, the 
voter elects one of several identical candidates to office for that period. He (the voter) 
lends her (the officeholder or manager) the funds s (per period) for the production of an 
output
= a«  8, j  (1)
where a® denotes the proportion of funds used "efficiently" and 0 is a technological var­
iable, randomly drawn from the interval [0,1]. Superscript a  refers to the case of asym­
metric information. In every period the incumbent receives private benefits w from being 
in office. The voter uses a RVRl, i.e. he re-elects the period t incumbent for t+1 if and
only if her output does not fall below the critical level set by the voter. The new 
element in this chapter is that the realisation of the technological random variable 0^  is
1. See e.g. Salmon (1987).
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privately observed by the incumbent at the beginning of period t. Since 0^  is not observed 
by the voter, his RVRl cutoff level cannot be chosen contingent on it.
Results 3.1 and 3.2, below, confirm that the mechanism of electoral control as described 
in chapter 2 works in a similar way in the case of asymmetric information. The main dif­
ference is that, because of her private information, the incumbent will enjoy an informa­
tion rent. Before stating the results, I define the new equilibrium concept.
Definition: (1-1^-equilibrium) A political equilibrium with a representative voter and
with asymmetric information is a sequence { a ”  ^ , such that
(i) the voter uses a RVRl, i.e. in every period t, the voter sets an optimal cutoff level 
, taking the incumbent’s best-response pattern as given;
(ii) in every period t, the incumbent chooses such as to maximise her inter-tempo­
ral utility, taking /  f as given.
 ^ = 0, . . .
This definition is essentially the same as that of 1-1-equilibrium. The only difference is 
that under asymmetric information, as already mentioned, the voter cannot set his cutoff 
level contingent on the realisation of the random variable, since he does not observe it. 
Result 3.1 characterises the political equilibrium under asymmetric information.
Result 3.1: The unique 1-1^-equilibrium is characterised as follows: In every period t, 
the voter requires output of at least
8 f = min 2^'2
W + 5
(2)
in order to re-elect the incumbent. The latter will satisfy this requirement by using a pro­
portion




of the funds (and therefore be re-elected) if and only if [ 4^ ,7 ] . Otherwise, the 
incumbent "walks away" with the funds, i.e. she chooses a t^ = 0 .
D e m o n s t r a t io n  o f  Re s u l t  3.1: Suppose first that the voter's sequence of cutoff levels 
 ^ is given. After being elected for period t the incumbent observes 0^  and then
chooses optimally. The officeholder's valuation of being in office in period t is
where
a - « “J  ^  + 5 v“ ^ 2 i f g“ > « “
^  0 y  g ; <
As with symmetric information, only two levels of can be optimal, depending on
whether the incumbent prefers to go for re-election or not. This decision, in turn, 
depends on the realisation of 0^ . The incumbent will want to go for re-election if and only 
if
 ^a fy,
w + { 7 - a /  (0 p } 5  + 0 > w + 5 , (6)
 ^a
where a t  = g (sQ^ ) represents the minimum proportion of funds the incumbent has
to use for production in order to be re-elected. This implies that the period t incumbent 
wül set
0 if  0f< q
2. Notice that Vf+f" is independent of and gf  .
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where
represents the minimum level of 0^  required to make it worth for the incumbent to go for 
re-election.
Given this best-response pattern for the incumbent, the voter will set /  l. opti-
 ^ u  = o , ...
mally, i.e. such as to
max U = S  5'7t,(ê, (g “ )) 1“ (9)
t 1/ » 0,... t = 0
where 7t^ ( 0^  ) =Prob ( 0^  > 0^  ) = 7 -  0^  . From the first order conditions, using the 
assumption that 0^  are independent and uniformly distributed, it follows that
= , Vf , (10)
a
and, using the definition of a ,  , this yields
6v°+,
(Q/) -  2^0 ’ * (11)
Equations (8) and (10) together imply that the critical level of the random variable at 
which the incumbent will just want to satisfy the voter's requirement will be 0^  = ^2 , 
for all t. This, in turn, implies that the {ex ante) probability of the incumbent being re­
elected is 7t^  = V2 hi every period, and every elected candidate can be expected to stay in 
office for two periods.
The stationary value of office, under asymmetric information solves
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v“ = w + s + niè,)- {5 v“ - i £ [ â “ (e,) e , ^ ô ] }  (12)
where E [ â /  (0^ ) 0^  > ôj is the proportion of funds that an incumbent expects having 
to use for production in order to be re-elected, in periods where she chooses not to "walk 
away" with the funds. Solving (12), using (10), (11) and the fact that 7C = V2  » yields^
v“ = ----------------------------• (13)
1 - M m  i - I
Substituting v“ from (13) into (10) and (11), yields
and
respectively.
As in the case of symmetric information, the incumbent's budget constraint has to be 
taken into account, namely (0^ ) <7, V0^  , which is equivalent to (Ô) <7 . 
Using (10) and Ê = % , the incumbent's budget constraint becomes
3. In what follows, the approximation In2~2l3 is used to simplify some of the expressions.
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Taking this constraint into account, equations (14) and (15) yield expressions (2) and (3), 
respectively.^ □
It is worth noticing that the optimal choice of cutoff level which solves (9) involves the 
following trade-off: On the one hand, a higher cutoff level requires the incumbent to pro­
duce more if she wants to be re-elected. But on the other hand, it implies that the proba­
bility of the incumbent actually wanting to be re-elected becomes smaller. Due to the 
specific setting analysed here - in particular the independently and uniformly distributed
random variables 0^  - the solution to this optimization is simply expression (10).^
3.3 Comparison of electoral control under symmetric and asymmetric 
information
Not surprisingly, result 3.1 shows that electoral control under asymmetric information is 
less effective than under symmetric information, from the voter's point of view. This is 
basically due to the information rent that officeholders enjoy. The information rent is
reflected in a higher value of being in office as expressed in equation (13). It can be 
easily checked that v“ is always bigger than the corresponding value derived under sym­
metric information, v=w+j.^ This is true despite the fact that an officeholder can only 
expect to stay in office for two periods, on average, before losing it.
Equation (13) contains also the finding that an incumbent's expected utility is increasing 
in the discount factor 6. This means that, although the voter will increase the required
4. When constraint (16) is binding, the stationary value of being in office is 
v“-j/5~(w+j/2)/(7-0).
5. As long as 0^  are independently and identically distributed on the interval [0,M] with distribution
and density y(0f), satisfying the condition that the function [i-F(0t)]Zf(0t) be monotonically decreasing, 
the optimal 0^  will be independent of both 8, w and s. See Ferejohn (1986, proposition 3).
6. See equation (9) in chapter 2.
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output level as Ô increases (see equation (14)), the gains resulting from the fact that 
with higher Ô the future benefits are valued more will always dominate.
a ( 0 / )  =  Const
(a) (b)
FIGURE 3.1: The bureau's productivity as function ofQ: (a) symmetric information,
(b) asymmetric information.
Figure 3.1 compares a  (0^ ) with the corresponding function a(0^) derived under sym­
metric information. It illustrates the information rent accruing to the incumbent, i.e. it 
shows how the incumbent can reduce her productivity in response to the fact that the 
voter cannot make the RVRl contingent on 0^ , such as to reduce the proportion of funds 
used productively.
_  a
Finally, from equation (2), expected output per period, S g“] , can be expressed as
_ a
g = -g  = min (17)
The comparative statics of expected output with respect to s shows a similar picture as 
under symmetric information. An increase in s is initially associated with an increase in
expected output with a slope of 7 4 . Beyond a critical level s , however, expected output 
increases at a lower rate. This leads to the following decentralisation result for the case
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of asymmetric information. It represents the counterpart of result 2.2 derived under sym­
metric information.
Result 3.2: Fiscal decentralisation (i.e. N>1) is strictly beneficial if the total budget sis  
sufficiently large relative to the private benefits of office w, and the latter are not decreas­
ing too quickly in the number of offices in the federation, i.e. if
^ Nw{N)>wQ),  m > l  . (18)
D e m o n str a tio n  o f  R e s u lt  3.2: Denote total funds allocated to and g^  ^ expected
output produced by office n. For simplicity, assume that the budget is split equally under 
fiscal decentralisation, i.e. s^^^slN. From equation (17) and the assumption of i.i.d. ran-
- a
dom shocks 0^, it follows that expected total output in the federation 2^ 8n er period.
_a
whereby g  ^ is equal to the expression in (17), with the specification that w is now
treated as a function w(N) of the number of offices. Expected total output in period t will 
therefore o




From the first condition stated in result 3.2 (and recalling result 3.1), it follows that total 
output under centralisation will be = 00^[w(7)+5].
In the remainder of this demonstration, I will show that Ngj {^>g  ^for some N>1, which is 
equivalent to
N ‘min [ 0^ 5„ , 00^(w(N) +s^) ]>b  0/w(7) +s) ^3 N  . (20)
Combining equation (19) with the first condition stated in result 3.2 we know that under 
centralisation expected output will be equal to [w(l)+s]/[4/b-2-ln2]. It is now obvious
56
that equation (19), jointly with the two conditions stated in result 3.2, implies that there 
exists N>1 such that
I / -  > “
Results 2.2 and 3.2 show that, for a given level of private benefits of office, w, accruing 
to the incumbent, there is scope for fiscal decentralisation whenever the public funds s 
under the responsibility of that officeholder exceed a critical level. This critical level is
a
s under symmetric information and s under asymmetric information. The following 
result compares these two critical levels.
Result 3.3: There is more scope for decentralisation under asymmetric information than 
under symmetric information, in the sense that s <s .
D e m o n str a tio n  o f  R e s u lt  3.3: Condition (16) holds with equality for s equal to
î “ = ( g - f +  w . (22)
Condition (12) in chapter 2 holds with equality for s equal to
s = -— -  • w . (23)
1 — 0
From this it follows that s - s < 0  for all 5 g (0,1]  . □
The following intuition can be given for this result. Under both symmetric and asymmet­
ric information the incumbent will not misallocate any public funds, as long as s is very 
small relative to w. As s is increased, her "temptation to walk away" with the funds also 
increases, until the point where she starts misallocating a (increasing) fraction of the
funds. This point is precisely at and s , respectively. Since under asymmetric infor­
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mation the incumbent has an information advantage that gives her more discretion, this 
point is reached earlier, i.e. s < s ,
3.4 Electoral decentralisation II: Better informed voters
It has often been argued in the literature on fiscal federalism that fiscal and political 
decentralisation would imply that the local authorities will be better informed about local 
preferences and local conditions. Therefore, their policies would serve the local needs 
more efficiently and more accurately. Usually, the literature does not consider the possi­
bility that the centre could use a revelation mechanism in order to reveal the local infor­
mation. Once this possibility is taken into account, it is not so clear any more why 
decentralisation should be superior.
Here I will make a different assumption on the information structure. I assume that with 
fiscal and political decentralisation the voters tend to be better informed about the cir­
cumstances under which the public officials provide the services. This section confirms 
the intuition that, under this hypothesis, electoral control will be more effective on the 
local level than on the federal level. This provides another justification for decentralised 
government. This section also clarifies further the role of asymmetric information in this 
model of repeated elections (see result 3.5).
The model developed in section 3.2 is now modified in order to capture a variable degree 
of uncertainty for the voters by varying the support of the random technological variable.
0  is now assumed to be uniformly distributed on the interval [ V2-<^ , V2+o^ ]» where G may 
vary between 0 and ^ 2 - G=corresponds to the case analysed in the preceding sections. 
0=0 corresponds to the case of symmetric information with 0 =%.
Result 3.4: Allowing for a variable degree of asymmetric information, the unique 1-1^- 
equilibrium is characterised as follows: For small values of o, i.e. G <7/6 , the voter 




w + s (24)
in order to re-elect the incumbent. The latter always satisfies this requirement. For larger 




in order to re-elect the incumbent. The latter will satisfy this requirement as long as
(26)
Otherwise, she "walks away" with the funds, i.e. she chooses 0
D emonstration of Result 3.4: Suppose that the voter's sequence of cutoff levels
} is given. Following the same argument as in section 3.2, the incumbent’s
t =  0,...
best-response pattern can be summarised by
Ô V
-  A a t (0,) = , (27)
t + i
and she will always set â / < Ô j  /  s .
Given this best-response pattern and the budget constraint a  < i  for the incumbent, the
a
voter will set {S t }  ^  ^ optimally, i.e. such as to
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a  a  &Oimax
There are two side-constraints to this maximisation. The first comes from the fact that the 
probability of re-election cannot exceed 1. This follows from the incumbent's budget
constraint , which implies that the incumbent will not be able to satisfy S ,
whenever 0 ^< 0  ^ , where 0,= | “ A .  Thus, given , the probability that the 
incumbent will actually go for re-election is
7C, = ---------------^ ---------------  . (29)
In what follows the two cases < 0^  and are analysed in turn. First, suppose
that Q < 0^  which is the case when j  Given this, no can be
optimal, where g^ =  {V2 - q ) s . This is because, within the range < g y any
increase in g^ has no effect on 7t^ . Therefore g^ must satisfy - q ) s  .
Whether an increase of g "  strictly above g^ is optimal, depends on the sign of the 
derivative
at I  “ = g . From the definition of 7t^  it follows that the derivative of (30) at |  = g^
is positive for o>H6, This means that g^  must solve the first-order condition to (28) 
which yields
7. In this case, the incumbent's individual rationality constraint (6) is never binding in equilibrium.
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-a 7 r; "1
St ~ 2 [2  * (31)
For a  < 7 / 6 , the derivative of (30) is not positive which means that the optimal choice 
of cutoff level of output for the voter is
«<“ = [ 5 - 0 ] ^  • (32)
Suppose now that ^  > 6 , . Given this, no i f < g  can be optimal,
where 8 = [7 /2  -  a] 5  ^ . This is because, within the range g “< , any increase
in has no effect on Therefore g'^ must satisfy | “ > [ 7 / 2 - a ] 0 v ^ ^ ^  •
Whether an increase of g^  strictly above 8^ is optimal, depends on the sign of the 
derivative
du _ att, (33)
a ^ r  a i r
at 8^ = 8^ ' From the definition of and the hypothesis 0^  > 8 ^, it follows that the
* aderivative in (33) is positive for all o>lf6. This means that g ^  must solve the first-order 
condition to (28) which, in this case, yields
■ (34)
Solving equation (12) stated in section 3.2 for the stationary value of office yields in this 
case
8. In this case, the incumbent’s budget constraint is never binding, in equilibrium.
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(35)
and, using (34),this yields
-----------------  . (36)
2  I  ; T; 1
5 [ i . a ] " 2 a  8a ^L2 +Gj ln2
For a  < 7 / d , the derivative in (33) is not positive which means that the optimal choice 
of cutoff level of output for the voter is
= [ j - ( t] S v“ ^ j . (37)
Solving equation (12) for the stationary value of office yields in this case
v“ = ________ (38)
T + a
and, using (37), this yields
-a  _ w + s
6  t ~ (39)
Equations (31), (32), (36) and (39) yield the equations (24) and (25) which are stated in 
the result. □
On the basis of this result, a comparison of expected output levels under different degrees 
of asymmetric information is possible. Such a comparison is, however, complicated by
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the fact that a variation of o  also entails a variation of the incumbent's budget constraint. 
In order to simplify, but also to separate the main point of this section from the effects 
underlying the decentralisation result 3.2,1 assume for the following argument that Ô, w 
and s are such that the incumbent's budget constraint is binding for any value of a.
Result 3.5: Assume that w/s and 6 are sufficiently large for the incumbent's budget con­
straint to be binding for any g  e  [0, ^  . Then, an increase in G reduces expected out­
put. Therefore, if the voters' uncertainty about the technology used by the local
government is smaller than about the central government's technology, i.e. 0^ < c f ,
_  aZ, - a C
then they will prefer the former to produce the public services, i.e. g > g
D emonstration of Result 3.5: Since the second assertion follows straightforwardly 
from the first one, I only have to demonstrate that an increase in o reduces expected out­
put. If G < 1 /6  and the budget constraint is binding, then we know from result 3.4 that 
the output level required by the voters is g ” = _ qJ 5 . We also know that the
incumbent always satisfies it, i.e. tc=7. This implies that expected output is
= 7C -  o]  ^ . (40)
If G >  1 /6  and the budget constraint is binding, then we know from result 3.4 that the 
output level required by the voters is g "  = I t h e  probability that the 
incumbent satisfies it is 7C = 1 /4  + 1 /  ( 8 g ) . This implies that expected output is
g =7ig“ = | [ ^7+a- i -  s . (41)
-a
It can be checked easily that in both cases the derivative dg / 3 a  is strictly negative in 
the relevant ranges, except for a = V2 * where differentiating (40) yields 0. Therefore, as 
long as the incumbent's budget constraint is binding for all a, an increase in a  reduces 
expected output. □
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3.5 Fiscal decentralisation II: Political yardstick competition
The previous sections have illustrated that under asymmetric information the agent will 
get a considerable information rent. In this section, I develop the argument that the voters 
may benefit from fiscal decentralisation, since it enables them to set up a form of yard­
stick competition between local governments. The theory of (economic) yardstick com­
petition has been developed by Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983) and Shleifer (1985). A 
similar reasoning has been used in the context of fiscal federalism by Breton and Scott 
(1978) and Salmon (1987). These authors describe both "horizontal" and "vertical" com­
petition. The former has governments on the same hierarchical level competing, while 
the latter refers to competition between different governments on different levels. In this 
section, I illustrate how these ideas work within the model of repeated elections devel­
oped above. The voters can set up political yardstick competition by using a RVRl that 
incorporates relative performance evaluation.
To see how electoral yardstick competition works and how it allows the voters to reduce 
the government's information rent, suppose that s is split in halves and two different offi­
cials are elected to produce = a 8 ^  and g \  = a 0 ^  , respectively.^
In result 3.2, the gains associated with such decentralisation due to the reduction of the 
budget have already been emphasised. In order to focus on the effects of yardstick 
competition, I assume in this section that  ^is in a range where the boundary constraint 
(16) is binding. From result 3.3, we know that the corresponding constraint in the case of
symmetric information^^is also binding. Thus, decentralisation does not entail any gains 
of the type described in so far. The gains described here arise because the voters can 
improve incentives for the officeholder in one region by making use of information from 
other regions. This enables them to reduce the agents' information rents.
This is easiest to see in the case where 0;^ and ^2t ^  perfectly correlated. In this case 
the voters can actually eliminate the agents' information rents altogether.
9. Nothing of essence would change if n>2 bureaus would be created.
10. See equation (12) in chapter 2.
11. Of course, the random variables are still assumed i.i.d. over time.
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Result 3.6: I f^ n  and ^ 2t perfectly correlated, then through fiscal decentralisation the
voters can implement the same outcome as under symmetric information if they can 
buildup a reputation.
D emonstration of Result 3 .6 :1 derive the result by constructing a particular RVRl 
and showing that voters can eliminate all information rents by committing themselves to 
19this rule. It is also shown below that this rule can be sustained as a subgame-perfect 
equilibrium. Suppose that all voters (in both regions) commit to the following RVRl, 
which I will call rule H(^):
Definition: (rule H(6 ))
Ifgk>Sl, where k,l=l,2 and k ^ l ,  then incumbent k is re-elected and receives a transfer 
b>0 while incumbent I is not re-elected.
I f  gj^=gl‘‘>0, then both incumbents are re-elected.
Ifg]^=gl^=0, then both incumbents are not re-elected.
Consider first incumbent fs {1=1,2) decision (or equivalently taking this rule H 
and gj^, j ^ i ,  as given. Since she strictly prefers to be re-elected, her best responses are 
as follows
\  1 i f  a "  = 7
<  = a  (42)
 ^Oy + E i f  Oy < 1
where e is a small, positive number. ^ 4 Therefore, in equilibrium we will have a f ‘'=af‘'=l.
12. It is assumed here that the two incumbents are not able to collude. In this context, the possibility of 
collusion would make relative performance evaluation ineffective.
13. This is for 0^ >O. When 0^=0 the incumbent cannot do anything to be re-elected
14. Here I assume that e is the smallest increment that is perceived by the voters to make a difference on 
their utility. This is done to avoid the existence problem (of a best-response) due to the continuous 
action space, e can be any real number from the open interval (0,206/j).
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The reasoning, however, relies implicitly on the hypothesis that the voters will stick to 
rule H(^). The problem is one of time consistency (or subgame perfection): Once the 
output is produced, the voters will prefer not to make any transfer to an incumbent. This 
means that if one ofidceholder produces more than the other, she cannot expect the voters
to pay the announced transfer b. This leads to an equilibrium with g f‘'=gf'=0. Notice that, 
contrary to the Ferejohn paradox, this outcome is not Pareto efficient, since whenever 
Qt>Oy the incumbent would strictly prefer to be re-elected and would, in principle, be will­
ing to use all the funds for production. The only way to sustain the efficient outcome 
described above, is by the incumbents using the following type of trigger strategy:^
Set =1 as long as the \oters stick to rule H(b).
Set a ”(,' + 2)=0 in the period after they deviate from rule H(b) by not making the 
announced transfer.
Given this strategy, the voters clearly have an incentive to stick to rule H(^), as long as 
b is not too large. Otherwise, the voters will not be willing to make the transfer 6 , even if 
they expect to receive the maximal output in period {f+l). That is, as long as
where c>0 denotes the opportunity cost for the voters of one unit of transfer, the voters 
will want to stick to rule H(6 ). Therefore, if incumbents use trigger strategies of the type 
just described, and if condition (43) holds, then any rule H(^) is credible. On the other 
hand, b ought to be large enough to provide an incentive for the incumbents, i.e. for a 
fixed e, it follows from footnote 18 that b must be bigger than &s/(25). This fact, together
with condition (43), implies that b must be in the range
15. The argument is related to the one in Chemla (1994) where managers have to build up a reputation for 
being "soft” in the wage bargaining with the workers in order to induce them to exert a high effort. 
Here, the "soft" action by the voters is to make the announced transfer at the end of the period.
16. Notice that an incumbent can never threaten to set a=0 for more than one period, since after one 
period she will be out of office.




This means that, if b lies in this range, and it happens to be the case that gjp-g/ then the 
voters in region k will make the promised transfer b in order to keep the reputation of
10
using rule H. This is how the same outcome as under symmetric information (which is 
efficient) can be sustained as a subgame perfect equilibrium under asymmetric informa­
tion with relative performance evaluation. □
3.6 Conclusion and relation to the literature
This chapter has extended the model of chapter 2 to the case of asymmetric information. 
The intuition about the potential benefits of decentralisation described there carries over 
to this case. Moreover, two new arguments for decentralisation have been developed in 
this chapter. First, if voters are better informed about the local conditions of public goods 
provision, they will be better off under decentralisation than under centralisation. Sec­
ond, the total information rents accruing to the government can be limited by the use of 
electoral yardstick competition which is only possible under decentralisation.
The results derived in this chapter are related to the literature on yardstick competition
and comparative performance evaluation. While my results confirm the basic intuition 
which would follow from that literature, the framework considered here is different in 
three respects: (i) The analysis here is carried out from the point of view of the voter(s), 
i.e. the principal(s), rather than being concerned with Pareto efficiency. It is clear that in 
this framework (with all risk-neutral individuals, a common time discount factor and lin­
ear effort costs) any outcome will be Pareto efficient. The reason for this is that the prob­
lem is essentially the division of a cake of fixed size s between all voters and all 
candidates for office. Since no funds are thrown away, any outcome is Pareto-efficient.
18. Since voters commit to their re-election rule at the beginning of each period, they can choose b close 
to ej/ 25 . But, in equilibrium, they will never actually have to make the transfer and the choice of b 
does not affect their utility as long as it is in the range defined by (44).
19. Major contributions to that literature include Lazear and Rosen (1981), Holmstrom (1982), Green and 
Stokey (1983), Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983), Mookherjee (1984), Shleifer (1985) and others.
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The question asked here is: How does yardstick competition affect the size of the cake 
accruing to the voters?
(ii) My analysis differs from the standard literature on yardstick competition also in that 
I use an incomplete contract framework. Under the simplifying assumptions made here, 
there would be no role for relative performance evaluation if complete contracts were 
feasible.
(iii) The problem analysed here is one of repeated elections with infinite horizon. Con­
trary to the standard literature on yardstick competition, it is thus dynamic. The problem, 
however, is stationary and does not raise any of the inherently dynamic issues considered 
in some recent contributions on yardstick competition, such as Holmstrom (1982b), Gib­
bons and Murphy (1992), Meyer (1995) or Meyer and \dckers (1994).
The latter is an interesting paper, since it contains both incomplete contracts and dynamic 
considerations. The authors show that comparative performance information may not 
always be useful when contracts are incomplete. They identify two sources of ineffi­
ciency under yardstick competition: Comparative performance evaluation may worsen 
either the ratchet effect or the reputation effect in a dynamic agency relationship. The fact
that these two effects do not appear in my model is part of the explanation for the differ- 
'X)ent results. Another part of the explanation is that my analysis is focused on the princi­
pal’s payoff instead of Pareto efficiency.
I do not claim, of course, that these two effects do not play a role in the real world. But I 
abstract from them - as I do from all other arguments which work in favour of centralisa­
tion - because my aim is here only to identify the benefits of decentralisation. As I argue 
in chapter 1, this first step in the direction of a more realistic cost-benefit analysis of 
decentralisation is not properly founded in most of the literature on fiscal federalism. 
This is the reason why my analysis is completely one-sided. It is only in a next step that 
one can incoiporate the arguments developed here in a more complete analysis which 
evaluates the trade-off between the costs and benefits of decentralisation.
20. The reputation effect is ruled out by the assumption that 0^  is ii.d. over time. The ratchet effect is not 




CLASS FORMATION AND REFORM
4.1 Introduction and relation to the literature
Societies, at times, face fundamental institutional reforms. The changes in a number of 
former communist countries which are being transformed into market economies are 
recent examples. Some workers change their jobs, others become self-employed or 
unemployed, others still become employers, entrepreneurs or capitalists. New firms are 
set up, others are restructured, privatised or closed down. Clearly, such fundamental 
reforms are associated with extraordinary risks on both individual and macroeconomic 
levels. Many developing countries also face similar, deep structural reforms involving 
the transition from more traditional, bureaucratic or collectivist to more modem, compet­
itive or market-based institutions.
This chapter attempts to shed some light on the way economic and political institutions 
interact during the transition from a collectivist to a competitive economy. In particular, 
I am interested in the following questions: How are the risks associated with transition 
allocated? What types of individuals will tend to move to the new, competitive sector? 
>^ till there be enough entrepreneurs willing to take the necessary risks such that the mar­
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ket sector can develop? Under what conditions can transition be politically smooth and 
irreversible? Under what conditions can it happen that a majority of the population suf­
fers from the transition?
Some of these are old questions that have been dealt with in the early literature on eco­
nomic development. In his very influential work, Lewis (1954) described the process of 
development as a gradual transition from a stagnating traditional economy with surplus 
labour and inefficient use of resources to a modem, efficient and growing economy, 
through a stage of dualism (with both a traditional and a modem sector). Following 
Lewis, a large part of the literature on economic development has viewed the process of
development in a similar light. ^  Implicitly or explicitly, the process of sectorial migration 
and transition is seen as a desirable development that needs to be fostered through appro­
priate policies and which is essentially irreversible.
A more balanced perspective on the desirability of such a transition is reached from Sen’s 
(1966) analysis of production in a dual economy. He gave several reasons why surplus 
labour, and a wage gap between the traditional and the modem sectors can exist in equi­
librium. He also showed that the traditional sector may be more efficient than the modem 
sector, if the latter is characterised by labour market imperfections.
In this chapter I consider the same type of dual economy as Lewis. Individuals can work 
either in the collectivist sector (which is characterised by institutionally set wages and 
surplus labour) or in the competitive sector (within wich a class structure with entrepre­
neurs and workers emerges and incomes are determined in competitive markets). Within 
this framework I argue, similarly to Sen, that either of the two systems may dominate the 
other in terms of welfare. The welfare criteria I consider are the Pareto criterion and the 
majority mle.
Another related branch of the literature studies rural-urban migration in the presence of 
urban wage rigidities and unemployment. In their celebrated articles Todaro (1969), and 
Harris and Todaro (1971) endogenised the sectorial choice of workers who migrate to the 
sector that yields the highest expected wage for them, balancing the higher earnings 
opportunities against the higher risks in the city. Two crucial assumptions underlie the 
Harris-Todaro model: First, all workers are identical with respect to both their skills and
1. See Kuznets (1955), Rostow (1960), Barber (1961), Enke (1962), Fei and Ranis (1964), Todaro (1969), 
Harris and Todaro (1971), among others.
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their reservation wage, and, second, the traditional sector is taken to be intrinsically inef-
ficient and only persists because of a wage rigidity in the modem sector. The model pre­
sented below, does not build on these assumptions.
More recently, Baneijee and Newman (1995) take a different approach to migration. In 
their model, workers differ in their initial wealth. As in the Harris-Todaro model, the pro­
duction technology is assumed to be more efficient in the urban sector than in the rural 
sector. In the latter, in turn, credit markets work more efficiently because of the absence 
of asymmetric information, there. Urban credit market imperfections act as a barrier to 
migration, since they raise the cost of moving to the urban sector. Baneijee and Newman 
show that this barrier is particularly high for the rural middle class who may be reluctant 
to migrate, although this would be socially optimal. The contribution of Baneijee and 
Newman (1995) is one in a series of recent papers recognising that, despite their produc­
tive inefficiencies, traditional institutions may persist because they are more efficient in
some other ways. In this paper, I join this line of reasoning by emphasising the compar­
ative advantage of collectivist institutions for social insurance. In contrast to Baneijee 
and Newman, I derive all differences between the two sectors only firom institutional dif­
ferences - the economic fundamentals remain identical in both sectors.
Motivated by the recent historical events, economists began to study the transition proc­
ess from a communist to a market economy. Many of the arguments from the 1950's 
development literature are reappearing now in the context of transition economies. The 
state-owned (traditional) sector is seen as inefficient, and the benefits of the transition to 
a market-based (modem) system are usually emphasised. Then, for many authors, transi­
tion appears as widely desirable and necessary.^ In practice, however, in many countries 
such a transition has now turned out to be more difficult than predicted. The development 
of the private sector has been progressing very slowly. A large number of people have 
been suffering rather than benefiting from the reforms. On a political level, in some coun­
tries the reforming governments were voted out of office. Consequently, interest in the
2. The Harris-Todaro model has been criticised and extended in different ways. See e.g.. Fields (1975, 
1989). Standing (1978) argues that reservation wages are higher for the workers who are already 
employed in the urban sector than for the rural workers contemplating migration. This implies, on the 
one hand, that a class of long-term urban unemployed will emerge and, on the other hand, that the tradi­
tional sector will not persist in the long-run.
3. See also Stiglitz (1990), Varian (1990), Xu (1993) and Townsend (1994), among others.
4. See e.g. Journal of Economic Perspectives (1991), Sachs (1991), Dewatripont and Roland (1992).
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costs of transition has now emerged both in the political debate and in the academic lit­
erature.^
In this chapter, I hope to shed some light on the issues of development and transition by 
pointing out what I believe to be a fundamental trade-off between allocative efficiency 
and social insurance. In the model developed below the traditional economy is taken to 
be a collectivist system in which workers contribute to production and are rewarded inde­
pendently of their abilities, their talents and their marginal productivities. All production 
units (viz. firms), whether highly productive or not, employ the same number of workers, 
and all output is collected and shared (equally) among all the workers and managers. 
Since production cannot be observed, such a system involves clearly substantial i n ^ -  
ciencies due to the misallocation of talent (managers are not more talented than the aver­
age worker) and labour (its marginal product is not equalised across productive units). 
On the other hand, the traditional system provides (social) insurance at a lower cost than
is possible in the modem economy.^ No-one bears risk; both individual ability and plant 
productivity risks are perfectly pooled in the collectivist society.
In contrast to this, the modem economy is much more flexible. It uses the same resources 
more productively by (partially) revealing the abilities of individual labourers and the 
productivities of individual firms. More productive firms make more profits, and more 
able individuals tend to eam higher incomes. Moreover, the labour market is flexible and 
workers are allocated such as to equate their marginal product across firms. Following a 
series of papers by Kihlstrom and Laffont (1979, 1983), Kanbur (1979a, 1979b, 1981), 
Newman (1991), Baneijee and Newman (1993) and Laussel and Le Breton (1995), I take 
a general equilibrium approach to the process of firm creation and the emergence of
entrepreneurial and working classes. My model of the competitive economy extends 
Kanbur s (1979a) work by introducing individuals of different entrepreneurial ability and
o
considering the allocation of such ability (or talent). Knowing their type and their risk
5. See e.g. Aghion and Blanchard (1994), Sachs and Woo (1994) or Rasier (1995).
6 .1 assume that there is no aggregate risk. With aggregate risk, egalitarian risk-sharing in the collectivist 
system is not fully efficient if workers have different attitudes towards risk. Efficient risk-sharing would 
require the less risk averse individuals to bear more risk than the more risk averse individuals.
7. Kihlstrom and Laffont follow the Knightian view of the entrepreneur as a risk-taking owner-manager; 
see Knight (1921). Entrepreneurs bear the risk of being more or less successful in their business. Work­
ers bear no risk. This view can be traced back to Cantillon (1755) and, as Kanbur (1980) argues, is very 
different from Schumpeter's (1934,1936,1954) view of the Mitrepreneur as an innovator.
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aversion, some individuals will choose to become labourers, others entrepreneurs. Since 
production cannot be observed, no insurance or stock markets exist and entrepreneurs 
have to bear the risk o f business failure. Moreover, there is an income risk associated 
with an individual s entrepreneurial ability. Such risk-bearing represents the cost of
modernity which has to be weighed against the benefit of increased productivity.^
If a majority of individuals expect to be better off in the modem economy, then, starting 
from a traditional economy, they can vote for a total reform. This would mean an imme­
diate closure of all traditional production activity and a mass "migration" to the private 
sector. In reality such a "big bang" reform may be neither feasible nor desirable because 
of the associated costs of restructuring. Here I abstract from all such costs, except for 
those associated with risk-taking. Even so, I show that a majority may suffer from such a 
"big bang" reform and regret it.
If a more gradual approach to reform is taken, no-one is forced to leave the traditional 
sector. In this case, the outcome will be one of the following: (i) It may be that the nega­
tive externality of those choosing to migrate on those initially not wishing to leave the 
collectivist sector is so large that the latter will be induced to also move to the modem 
sector and, eventually, everyone will end up there. This could be interpreted as a "spon­
taneous big bang", as opposed to the "political big bang" reform described above, (ii) If 
the extemality is weaker, then a gradual reform process will lead to an equilibrium with 
a dual economy, where some individuals remain in the traditional sector. In both these
outcomes, again, a majority of the individuals may regret the changes.
"Mthin this framework, I also develop several results on the political economy of transi­
tion. I show, e.g., that either gradual or total reform or total reform may be chosen by a
8. Laussel and Le Breton (1995) also introduce different abilities to the model of Kihlstrom and Laffont 
(1979). They analyse the allocation of talent when all individuals are risk neutral. Here, individuals dif­
fer both in their risk attitudes and their managerial abilities (they are, however, identical as workers). 
The allocation of talent is studied within a different gen ia l equilibrium framework by Murphy, Shleifer 
and \^shny (1991) and Acemoglu (1993).
9. As mentioned above, the market incompleteness is derived from the non-observability of output. Some 
authors have made the point that even if output is non-observable, a second-best insurance on the basis 
of inputs is feasible, if some inputs are observable and the production function is common knowledge; 
see Grossman, Hart and Maskin (1983). But even if some insurance is available for entrepreneurs, full 
insurance is not optimal, in general, and all the trade-offs described here remain relevant.
10. For an empirical study of the impact of out-migration on the traditional sector and on the modem sec­
tor in a number of developing countries, see Hathaway (1964).
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majority, even if it makes a majority worse off relative to no reform. I also show that, if 
society faces the democratic choice between gradual reform, total reform and no reform, 
there will always be a political polarisation. I.e., gradual reform will never be the most 
preferred alternative under majority voting. The relation of these results to the findings 
of Dewatripont and Roland (1992a and b) are discussed in section 4.8. My results are 
consistent with some of the recent developments in Eastern Europe and the Former 
Soviet Union, where moderate reformers have essentially lost to either the radical 
reformers or to the conservatives. Only in countries like e.g. China or Vietnam, where the 
option of total reform was ruled out dictatorially, more moderate reforms have been pos­
sible.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. After introducing the economic 
fundamentals of the society, which remain the same in all systems (in section 4.2), and 
characterising the first-best allocations (in section 4.3), I characterise equilibrium in the 
collectivist and in the competitive economies (in sections 4.4 and 4.5), respectively. Sec­
tion 4.6 describes total reform, whereas section 4.7 is devoted to the analysis of gradual 
reform and dual economy. Section 4.8 contains the main conclusions, compares them 
with some conflicting results in the literature and sketches some possible extensions.
4.2 The fundamentals of the economy
Individual preferences, abilities and technologies are given exogenously and are inde­
pendent of the economic system. The differences in the performance of different systems 
will thus be due to the different institutions associated with each economic system. In this 
section, I present the fundamental elements of the economy that are invariant across the 
systems.
There are two types of individuals: talented ones of high managerial ability and untal- 
ented ones of low ability. Talented individuals are characterised by a higher success rate 
in managing production (see below). As workers, all individuals are identical. There is a 
continuum of individuals, a proportion a  of which are talented and 1-a are untalented. I 
assume that a  is common knowledge, so that there is no aggregate risk. Individual pref­
erences are represented by a continuous and differentiable certainty equivalent function 
of the form
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V = v(y,n,R) ; (1)
whereby y denotes income earned with probability 7 t, and /? is an index of risk aver­
sion. R can take any value from the interval with R >0 andR < R ^ . The
certainty equivalent function (1) satisfies the following set of (rather weak) assumptions:
( A )  v ^ > 0  ; V y > 0  ; v j ^ > 0 ;
(B) v(y, i ,  . ) = y  ; v(y, tc, 0) = 7t y ;
(C) v( . ,oo)  = 0 .
I further suppose that abilities are uncorrelated across individuals. This is captured by the 
assumption that (R) = (R) = P(R) , where Ph(R) and P^fR) denote the cumulative
distributions of risk attitudes in the populations of high and low ability individuals, 
respectively.
Each individual is endowed with one, indivisible unit of labour time. To set up and oper­
ate a technology, a fixed investment of one unit of (managerial) labour time must be 
sunk. The proportion of managers is denoted e. Once this has happened, the production 
unit turns out to be either highly productive or not so. The probability of the unit being 
highly productive is if the manager is of high ability and %  if the manager is of low
ability, with Whatever the institution considered, a plant’s output is not verifiable
19by outsiders. For simplicity, I assume that the less productive units are not viable, or 
unproductive.^^ If the technology turns out to be viable, it is of the form
g(X) = X''; l > y > 0  , (2)
where g denotes output as a function of X, the amount of labour time (i.e., the proportion 
of individuals) being employed in that unit along with the manager.
11. With probability 1 -n income is 0.
12. Although it cannot be stolen.
13 .1 could have assumed a continuum of possible technological realisations, as in Kihlstrom and Laffont 
(1979) and Kanbur (1979a), without affecting the main argument.
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In this model, individuals face two types of risk: From an ex ante position they face an 
abihty risk; from an interim position (i.e., after having learned their ability) they still face 
a business risk. An important question in this chapter is: "How do different economic 
systems deal with these risks?"
4.3 The first-best allocations
Given these fundamentals, society could in principle maximise total output while, at the 
same time, providing full insurance for its members against both business and ability 
risks. The first-best benchmark considered here corresponds to the resource allocation 
that would be chosen by a social planner who had perfect knowledge of individual abili­
ties and risk attitudes, but did not know in advance the identity of the lucky or unlucky 
entrepreneurs. This means that even the social planner is not able to avoid some manage­
rial labour time being sunk in unproductive projects. In this sense, the notion of first-best 
considered here corresponds to interim efficiency.
Clearly, first-best requires that workers are allocated to occupations according to their 
abilities and to production units according to the plants' productivities, such as to maxim­
ise total output. Notice, however, that since a worker's ability is not publicly known, the 
first-best will, in general, not be feasible in the collectivist nor in the competitive econ­
omy. Denote £// the proportion of talented (high ability) managers in the total population, 
and El the proportion of untalented (low ability) managers in the total population. Result 
4.1 characterises the first-best:
Result 4.1: In the first-best, workers are allocated to production units such as to equalise 
their marginal products. The optimal mass o f managers is decreasing in y, i.e., the more 
strongly returns to scale are decreasing the more managers are needed. The precise char­
acterisation o f the first-best is different in either of the three following parameter ranges:
Regime I: y > l  -  a  .
Regime IT. 7 - a  > y>  [ ( 7 - a ) 7 c j  /  [ ( 7 -a)7c^ + .
Regime III: [ (7 -  a ) 7C^] /  [ (7 -  a ) -H a%%] > y .
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D emonstration of Result 4.1: In the first-best, individuals are fully insured and total 
output is maximised. It is easy to show that all first-best outcomes only differ concerning 
the distribution of consumption. The production function is strictly concave in non-man- 
agerial labour input. It follows that every production unit should employ the same 
amount of labour such that the marginal product of labour is equalised across production 
units. Non-managerial labour wiU only be used in viable production units, of which there 
are . Total output is then given by
(3)
Talented individuals are on average more productive managers but all individ­
uals are equally productive workers. It follows that in the first-best all managerial tasks 
should be performed by talented individuals, if there are enough of them. This is because, 
starting from (0,0), an increase in is more effective than an increase in e^. Therefore
£// is increased up to the interior optimum (EhfB/ 0). However, if the constraint < a
a becomes binding, then = a  and > 0 . Whether > 0 depends on the
sign of 3G(a, 0)/dz^ > 0 .
Maximising (3) with respect to £//, at Ejj=0, yields from the first-order condition 
^HFB -  1 -  y ' Since £// cannot exceed a, this is only feasible for y > i  -  a . Substitut­
ing £^ = 7 -  y and Zi=0 into (3), yields a total output in regime I  of
(4)
If y < 7 -  a , two other regimes are possible: As long as
l - a >  y > [ (7 -  a ) TtJ /  [ti^ a  + (7 -  a ) ] (regirm  77),
it is not optimal to employ untalented individuals as managers, i.e., Elfb=0 and e///?B=cx. 
Total output in regime II is given by
(5)
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Only if the production function is very strongly concave with
y < [ (7 -  a) 7t^ ] /  [tc^ a  + (7 -  a) ] (regime 7771. it becomes optimal to allocate
also some untalented individuals to managerial tasks. In this regime, we have ^hfb~ ^  
and -  7 - a - y [ 7  + a  - 7 ) ] ,  which follows from maximising (3) with
respect to 6^ ,, at Substituting this into (3) yields a total output in regime III of




FIGURE 4.1: The proportion of managers in the first-best.
Figure 4.1 shows how the optimal proportion of managers, depends
on y in the three regimes. If y is large {regime I), only talented individuals are allocated 
to managerial jobs up to the point where all talented individuals work as managers. In an 
intermediate range of y {regime 77), all talented individuals work as managers and all
14. The intuition for this is as follows: For high y ( > 1-a), the technology is close to constant returns to 
scale and the number of production units can be kept small in order to save on set-up costs. For low y 
(<l-a), returns to scale are more strongly diminishing and it is optimal to have more than 1-y produc­
tion units. But the economy runs out of talented managers. Any additional production units have to be 
run by untalented managers. This is, however, only optimal if y becomes very small.
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untalented as workers. Only if returns to scale are very strongly decreasing (small y, 
regime III) will also some untalented individuals be allocated to managerial tasks.
4.4 The collectivist economy
I model the traditional economy as a collectivist system (denoted C) that has some simi­
larities with the traditional sector described in Lewis (1954 and 1958) and Fei and Ranis 
(1964). The traditional sector in the Lewis-Fei-Ranis model, which was intended as a 
description of an underdeveloped rural area, has the following main characteristics: 
There is no competitive labour market; workers are paid "institutionally” fixed wages 
that are independent of (and actually above) the marginal product of labour. The sector is 
also characterised by surplus labour, i.e., labour that could be withdrawn without reduc­
ing total output.
I would like to argue here that this description is more convincing as a description of a 
collectivist economy where no competitive labour markets operate. My point is that an 
economy can have a competitive labour market, although it may be underdeveloped, or 
poor, or agrarian. At the same time an economy with the characteristics of a Lewis-Fei- 
Ranis traditional economy need not necessarily be poor, nor agrarian. Here, I propose the
following view of the collectivist economy: ^  Although the output of one particular firm 
is not observable by outsiders, it cannot be stolen by insiders (assume for instance that 
the quality can be either acceptable or zero so that physical quantities cannot escape). 
After production has taken place, it is pooled and each worker receives an income which 
is independent of both his ability and his marginal product. In fact, he receives a fixed 
(e.g. an equal) share of total output. Individuals are allocated randomly to either manage­
rial or productive jobs and to firms. The only variable that is chosen optimally in C is the 
number of production units that are set up, i.e., the proportion of managers in the popu­
lation, Zç. It is chosen by an unspecified authority (which may be thought of as either 
"tradition" or a "village council" or a "planning bureau") such as to maximise total out­
put, given the institutional features just described.
15. The following assumptions are e.g. consistent with the description and the findings 
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FIGURE 42: The sequence of events in a collectvist economy.
Since the output of an individual production unit cannot be observed, no manager has an
incentive to reveal her type.^^ Then occupations are allocated randomly and the ratio of 
talented to untalented managers will be oc/(i-a). This means that if Zç production units 
are set up, then -a)\ZQ production units will be viable. The random allocation
process also implies that each production unit employs an equal share of the labour force 
irrespective of whether it is viable or not. Therefore, labour employed in non-viable pro­
duction units represents surplus labour^ in the sense that its withdrawal would not reduce 
17output. The sequence of events is summarised in figure 4.2. Total output in C is then 
given by




Maximising (7) with respect to Zq yields from the first-order condition
Be = l - y (8)
Substituting (8) into (7), yields a total output in C of
16. Assume there is a small benefit of being a manager.
17. Sometimes the term "disguised unemployment" is used instead of surplus labour. The concept and 
some of the traditional thewies of surplus labour are discussed in Kao et al. (1964). See also Lewis 
(1954) and Sen (1966).
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<5c = k  a  + J i:j_ (;-a )]  ( 7 - ^ /  '* y"* . (9)
As the following result shows, more production units are set up in C than in the first-best, 
but since many of them are not viable, total output is lower.
Result 4.2: In the collectivist economy less output is produced than in the first-best with 
either the same number of production units (in regime I) or with more production units 
(in regimes II and III), i.e., Gpg>G(^, ^FBIIF^^ C*
D emonstration of Result 4.2: In section 4.3, the proportion of managers in the first- 
best in regime I  was shown to be epQj=l-y. Comparing this with equation (8) shows that, 
in regime /, the mass of managers is the same in both the collectivist and the first-best 
economies. For regimes II and III, similar comparisons yields that more production units 
are set up in C, i.e.,
Zc = l-y  > ^FBII = a  and ec = l-y  > Zppiii = i-7[i+a(7C///Tt£,-7)].
Turning to output, a comparison of equations (4) and (9), shows that the first-best output 
in regime I  exceeds total output in C. Similarly, a comparison of (5) and (6) with (9) 
yields the same finding for regimes II and III, respectively. □
Due to imperfect information, the allocation of talent will in general not be optimal, nei­
ther in the collectivist nor in the competitive economy. The collectivist institutions offer 
maximal insurance to individuals at the expense of productive efficiency. Managers have 
no incentive to reveal their luck so that some units keep employing labour, although they 
are unproductive. As the following section shows, the competitive institutions can partly 
solve this problem but at the cost of risk bearing and consequently insufficient entrepre­
neurship.
4.5 The competitive economy
The model of the modem economy is based on Kanbur (1979a) with the difference that
io
here the population is heterogeneous regarding managerial ability (or talent). ° As in C, 
individuals in the competitive sector first leam their ability which may be either high or 
low. Second, each individual chooses an occupation and becomes either entrepreneur or
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labourer. Then, entrepreneurs set up a firm and discover whether it is viable or not. If it 
is, they can hire labourers and produce. Entrepreneurs with non-viable firms are not able
to produce and are left with zero income.^^Individuals who choose to become workers, 
supply their labour on a perfectly competitive market and eam a sure wage. Here the 
implication of non-observability of output and employment by outsiders is that no insur­
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type is sunk luck
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FIGURE 4.3: The sequence of events in the competitive economy.
Given these assumptions, equilibrium in the competitive economy is defined as follows:
Definition 4.1: Competitive Equilibrium (CE) is a wage rate and partitions of both 
the sets of talented and untalented individuals in workers A j and managers (or entrepre­
neurs) Tf, for T=HJL, such that:
(i) each entrepreneur demands labourers such as to maximise profits, whereby she
takes the wage rate as given, i.e..
XcE = arg max:[A.“ ;
(ii) labour supply equals labour demand, i.e..
(10)
 ^ ^HCE ^LCE C^E » (11)
18. Sometimes the term "disguised unemployment" is used instead of surplus labour. The concept and 
some of the traditional theories of surplus labour are discussed in Kao et al. (1964). See also Lewis 
(1954) and Sen (1966).
19. Notice that they have sunk their labour endowment and cannot work elsewhere.
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where Zjç£ (for T=Hf.) denote the proportions of type T individuals in the total popula­
tion choosing to be entrepreneurs;
(Hi) individuals (indexed k) choose their occupation such as to maximise their expected 
utility, i.e., it must be the case that for T=HJL:
< V k E Ay’ ; (12)
and
^CE ^ ^ [  'cE » => ^ e Ty, , (13)
where rç£ denotes entrepreneurial income in CE.
Notice that, as in Kanbur (1979a, 1979b, 1981) or Khilstrom and Laffont (1979), no 
insurance market exists in this economy. This is, of course, a crucial assumption since a
competitive equilibrium with complete markets would clearly always be first-best. 
The assumption of incomplete insurance markets seems, however, reasonable on both 
theoretical and empirical grounds. Empirically, it can be viewed as a stylised fact that 
insurance markets tend to be among the last ones to be developed, even in economies 
with a long-standing history of market-based development. In transition economies, it is 
easy to argue that insurance markets are probably the most incomplete ones. Theoreti­
cally, the incompleteness of insurance markets can be justified within the present frame­
work by the asymmetry of information concerning both individual ability and firm 
productivity. Risk-bearing is the only device that induces individuals to sort out them­
selves. Even if insurance markets would develop, they would necessarily be incomplete 
(since observability is never perfect and monitoring is costly), and the basic trade-offs 
described in this paper would still be relevant. We can now proceed to characterise com­
petitive equilibrium.
Result 4.3: CE exists and is unique. The more risk averse individuals o f each type, will 
choose to become labourers, while the less risk averse will choose to become entrepre­
neurs.
D emonstration of Result 4.3: If an agent with risk aversion R and ability T  prefers 
to become entrepreneur, then from part (iii) of definition 4.1 and assumption (A), it must
20. See Kihlstrom and Laffont (1983).
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be the case that all agents with ability T and risk aversion less than R will also prefer to
become entrepreneurs. This holds for 7= ///.. Denote and ^  the risk aversion 
indices of the indifferent individuals of high and low managerial ability, respectively.
Using part (iii) of definition 4.1, and must solve
” 'C E  =  ~ ^ C E  \ : e  '  ( 1 4 )
(Notice that kj, may be outside the support of R, [R '^ '^.) From part (i) of definition 
4.1, it follows that
1
= [^ 1 '“'' • (15)
Using the total differences of equation (14) for T=HJ^, together with equation (1) and 
assumption (A), it can be shown that a higher wage is associated with the marginal
entrepreneur being less risk averse, i.e., A^///Aw^^ < 0 and A ^l/A w ^^ < 0 , respec­





^ = — < « •  (1«) 
dkT
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This, in turn, means that, a higher wage induces smaller proportions of individuals to 
become entrepreneurs, i.e., and
, whenever . In order to see that there exists a
unique wage, wç£, which also satisfies part (ii) of definition 4.1, define excess supply of 
labour as
Z(w) = 1 -  e^(w) -  e^(w) -  [% e^(w) + Tt^e^(w)] Xqe w^) . (19)
It is now easy to check that Z<0 for w=0 and Z>0 for w —> ©o . Moreover, Z(w) is con­
tinuous and monotonie in the relevant range (w>0). Z(w) is continuous because all its 
parts are continuous: From (19), it is clear that X(w) is continuous. To see that e//(w) and 
e (^vv) are also continuous, re-write part (ii) of definition 4.1 as
J — £// — Er
Since a marginal change in w has a marginal effect on the Ihs of this equation, it must also 
have just a marginal effect on the rhs. This equation also shows that a marginal change in 
w must have just a marginal effect on the sum (6y/4-6^ ) and on e// and 6^ ,, separately, since 
they move in the same direction. (Otherwise, there would be a contradiction to part (iii) 
of definition 4.1.) From this continuity and monotonicity, it follows that there is a unique 
value wcE>0 which clears the labour market, i.e., Z(wc£)=0. □
This result extends the findings of Kanbur (1979) and Kihlstrom and Laffont (1979) by 
establishing existence and uniqueness of CE with individuals of different abilities. As the 
following result confirms, individuals sort themselves according to the traditional Knigh­
tian view of entrepreneurship, depending on their risk aversion.
Result 4.4: In a CE, relatively more talented than untalented individuals become
entrepreneurs, i.e., P{kj)  > P{k^)  . Or, equivalently, the proportion ofH  types is higher 
among entrepreneurs than in the total population, i.e..
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^HCE ^LCE \  ^HCE ^LCE , 1
a ^ 7 - a ^ l e  +e +e <^-ccr (21)
a  1 a  *^HCE ^  ^ L C E  ^ H C E  ^  ^ L C E  J
D emonstration of Result 4.4: In a CE, and k ^  are defined by equation (14).
Since it follows that k^^> k ^  , because of assumption (A). And from this, the
result follows. □
This result suggests that although CE equalises workers' marginal products across 
21firms , in general, it will not achieve a first-best. There are three main sources o f ineffi­
ciency of CE. First, the absence of an insurance market makes it necessary for entrepre­
neurs to bear risk. This risk lowers expected utility, since individuals are risk averse. 
Second, also due to risk aversion, CE is normally characterised by a shortage of entrepre­
neurs (see result 4.6, below). Third, CE is in general characterised by a misallocation of 
talent, in the sense that relatively too many untalented and/or too few talented individuals 
become managers. Result 4.5 gives, for each regime, necessary and sufficient conditions 
for these inefficiencies to vanish and CE to coincide with a first-best.
Result 4.5: CE coincides with a first-best if and only if:
• R'=0, and there are sufficiently many risk neutral individuals, i.e., aP(0) > l - y , i n  
regime!,
• the most risk averse individual is not too risk averse, i.e., R^<Bn, in regime II. 
where Bn is defined below, and,
• R'=0, and there are sufficiently many risk neutral individuals, and the most risk
averse ones are not too risk averse, i.e.,
(I -  a )  P(0) > I - a - y [ l  + a  - !)]> regime III, where
Bill is defined below.
D emonstration of Result 4.5: From result 4.1 we know that there is a unique maxi­
mum feasible output and a unique output maximising allocation of talent. This implies 
that (^hcE'^lce)=(^hfb>^lfb) is necessary for CE to coincide with a first-best. It is also 
sufficient, since labour is allocated efficiently across firms.
21. From part (i) of definition 1, it is clear that the labourers will be allocated to firms efhciently, i.e., then- 
marginal products will be equalised.
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From part (i) of definition 1, = y . The profit of a successful entrepreneur is
'CE == ^CE  ^ -  ^CE ^CE • Notice also that i^ HCE>^ LjCE)=i^ HFB»^ LFB) implies that 
^CE~^FB-
Using this, we can write
Y
"ce 0 - 1 )  K s
(22)
In regime L the first-best requires e^^5 =7 -y and EipQ=0. From part (i) of definition 1, we 
know that in regime I  every viable firm employs A,/75=y/[(7 -y)Tt//] labourers.
This yields
^CE ~ C^E *
On the other hand, in regime /, some H-type individuals must be indifferent between the 
occupations, i.e.,
^CE ~ ^CEI * ^  ^
Since, from assumption (B),
v( r^Ej, % ,  R ) ^  v( r^^j, % ,  0) , (25)
and, from assumption (C),
^CEI » “  ^CEI
the necessary condition for a regime /  equilibrium to be consistent with (23) (and with the 
first-best) is that Rff=R'=0. Notice that this condition is also sufficient for
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^  regime L To see this, notice that, since TiH>T^L> condition
(23) implies
^CE ^ C^E *
which guarantees that no L-individual wants to become entrepreneur, i.e., 
^LCE~^LFB-^' This establishes that, in regime /, Rfj=R'=0 is necessary and sufficient for 
(^hce^^ lce)=(^hfb>^lfb)^
Next, consider regime II. where ^hfb~ ^  and Zip^=0, implying //=(^-a)/(ajt;^). This 
yields the following expression for the wage
-CE = - (28)
and, for the profit of a successful entrepreneur.
f  1 - a \ '^  
^CE ~ (^ -Y )  ocTt  ^j  *
For ^HFB~^y it must be the case that even the most risk averse H-individual prefers the 
risky occupation to the safe wage, i.e..
v( , (30)
or, using (28) and (29),
1 - a
) . (31)
Now define Bjj, the value of R ^  for which the rhs of (30) is equal to the Ihs. Then (30)
states that R^cBjj is a necessary condition for CE to coincide with the first-best. To see 
that it is also sufficient, notice that for 6^ g = 0 , it must be the case that
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^ C E -   ^ * (32)
But in regime II this condition is satisfied for any R>Oy since not even risk neutral L- 
individuals would want to become entrepreneurs. This can be seen from the definition of 
regime II given in section 3. It can be re-written as
I - y  1 - a  H L
which, using (28) and (29), imphes that y^cE '^^L^CE' And this guarantees that all L-indi- 
viduals choose to be labourers.
Finally, consider regime IIL where and EiFB=I-y-a-ya(nfj/Ki^-I). Define the
shadow wage, wpsm, and the shadow profits, rppm, as follows:
» '« /// = y"'- ’ (34)
and
^  FBIII ^FBIII ^FBIII  '
For CE to coincide with a first-best, wppjn must satisfy parts (i) to (iii) of definition 4.1. 
It is easily checked that it satisfies part (i), if Ve///- Substituting
f g  fbiii r /IT.. NT ( l - y ) K (36)
L
into equation (21 ), yields
”'C£ = \  ’’cE ■ (37)
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Since in regime III the marginal entrepreneur is of L type, equation (15) determines 
^LCE • By assumptions (A) and (B), for conditions (15) and (37) to hold simultaneously,
it is necessary that = /?’ = 0 . N. This condition is, however, not sufficient for
regime III, since it does not guarantee that 
^HCE=^HFBIII= '^ ThG following condition guarantees that, at the wage given by equation 
(37), all H-individuals become entrepreneurs, as required for the first-best. It states that 
even the most risk averse H-individual must prefer the risky occupation.
Define Bjn as the value of / fwh ich  makes the Ihs In (38) equal to the rhs. Using equa- 
tions (34) to (36), Bjjj is defined by
H u - y Ÿ  ■ n [ - '' ■ x] =
v(X ^- y ‘ - i -  ( l - y f  ■ ■ X , ,B ,„ ) , (39)
where X is given by equation (36). Thus, the second condition which has to hold for CE 
to coincide with a first-best in regime III is □
Notice that, even if CE does not coincide with a first-best, some individuals may be better 
off under CE than under the equal-treatment-first-best. But, of course, for each CE, there 
exists a redistribution of income which makes everyone better off and which is feasible 
in first-best.
Corollary 4.1: In the special case where all individuals are risk-neutral, CE coincides 
with the first-best.
D e m o n str a tio n  o f  C o r o l la r y  4.1: It is easily checked that R'^=0 implies that the 
conditions given in result 4.5 are satisfied, in all three regimes. □
A similar result appears in Kihlstrom and Laffont (1979) in their model, in which all indi­
viduals have the same ability. The result does not hold if workers have different produc­
tivities. Then, the non-observability of workers’ abilities makes competitive equilibrium 
inefficient, even with all risk neutral individuals. Laussel and Le Breton (1995) show that
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there will be too few firms in competitive equilibrium. In the present context, the ineffi­
ciencies of competitive equilibrium are also associated with too few firms. But here the 
underlying cause is the risk aversion of individuals. This is shown in the following result.
Result 4.6: I f  the conditions given in result 4.5 are not satisfied, then there will be too few  
entrepreneurs in CE in the sense that Qp.  ^> .
D emonstration of Result 4.6: Recall that the number of operating firms 
^CE-'^lfiHCE^'^L^LCE' ^  the conditions given in result 4.5 are not satisfied, then CE
does not coincide with the first-best, i.e., (^hce* ^lce  ^ ^  ^lfb  ^• three
steps shown below establish that this inequality implies that CE is characterised by too 
few operating firms relative to the first-best, i.e.,
* Step 1: ^ ^NFB impossible.
First, notice that ^hce^^HFB is only possible in regime I  and implies that Zc£>Zp£. In all 
three regimes, equilibrium wages and profits satisfy




r = ( 1 - 1 ) (41)
respectively. From equations (40) and (41), it follows that an increase in z^e  is associated 
with wqe going up and r^p going down. But, taking into account assumption (A), this is 
not consistent with the equilibrium condition WQp=v{r££,11^ ,0 ).
• Step 2. ^efb ^ ^HCE tmplies ^
If Z£p£>Zfjc£ is associated with , then step 2 is established. But even if
Zhpb>^hce is associated with eLFfi<^LC£ step 2 holds. To see this, suppose that all L- 
entrepreneurs are risk neutral. (If some were risk averse, the result would be even
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clearer.) Then the equilibrium condition Wce=’^ lTce ™ st hold. Substituting from equa­
tions (40) and (41) into this condition, yields
^LCE  “  Y )  ^HCE^  Y  ^ h c e
Differentiating 0>cE> using (42), yields
^ --------------- - y )  ^  0 . (43)
'HCE
• Step 3; ^hfb- ^ hce i'wp/zej ^u ?b>^lcE'
From equations (40) and (41), ^hfb~^hce aud ^lfb^^lce imply y '^PB'^ '^ CE &ud 
rFB<^CE- This, however, is inconsistent with equilibrium in all three regimes. To see this, 
consider first regime /, in which £hfb- ^ hce implies the equilibrium relation 
^CE-'^H^CE-'^(^CE>‘^H>^y This relation is inconsistent with WfE>^CE und rpg<rEE- lu 
regime III, ^hfb~^HCE implies the equilibrium relation wce='^û 'ce=^(Tce»'^ d (^ ) which 
also is inconsistent with wpB>wcp and rppKr^p. Finally, in regime //, equations (40) and
(41), imply that a risk neutral L-individual will choose the risky occupation if and only if
• (44)1 - y i - a  "
As this contradicts the definition of regime II given in section 4.3, which can be re-writ­
ten as
Y a
%  > 7Ü, , (45)I - y I - a
it means that step 2 holds also for regime II. □
Corollary 4.2: More production units operate in the collectivist economy than in the cor­
responding competitive equilibrium with the same fundamentals.
D em o n str a tio n  of  Co rollary  4.2: Follows directly from results 4.2 and 4.6. □
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Clearly, results 4.2 and 4.5 together imply that if CE achieves a first-best then total output 
in CE exceeds total output of the corresponding C with the same fundamentals. On the 
other hand, the inefficiencies due to risk-bearing in CE may be so severe that they exceed 
the allocation inefficiencies in C, so that wages and total output are higher in the collec­
tivist system. This is demonstrated now.
Result 4.7: As society becomes more risk averse (in the sense that every member 
becomes more risk averse), the proportion of entrepreneurs, total output and wages fall. 
For an infinitely risk averse society the three variables fall to zero.
D em o n str a tio n  o f  Result  4.7: Suppose that there are only H-individuals in the econ­
omy, i.e., a = i. (This only makes the result stronger.) Now consider any shift in the dis­
tribution P(R) of risk aversion in the population which results in the indifferent individual
being more risk averse, i.e., in a higher (Every individual becoming marginally more 
risk averse is sufficient for this.) Since, in equilibrium, condition (14) must hold, it fol­
lows (using assumption (A)) that dw ^^/dk^  < 0. From definition 4.1, tfjcE is given by
This shows that ^ ^ ^ ^ • Moreover, total output
^CE ~ ^HCE^  ^ (47)
also falls, i.e., dG^^/dk^^KO . Also from condition (14) and assumption (A), 
Rh -  ^  implies wce=0, which in turn implies Gqe=0 and O
Notice that wages and output in C do not depend on individuals’ risk attitudes. This 
implies that a sufficiently risk averse society is better off with a collectivist system. The 
remainder of this chapter considers the issue of economic and political transition from a 
pure collectivist economy to a competitive economy.
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4.6 Total reform
Suppose the economy initially takes the form of a collectivist economy of the type 
described in section 4.4. In such an economy all individuals are certain to eam the same 
income, w^. Consider first the case of total reform where the entire collectivist sector is 
closed down at once and all individuals find themselves in a modem economy of the type 
described in section 4.5. From corollary 4.1, we know that CE coincides with the a first- 
best, in the case where all individuals are risk neutral. Therefore, in a risk neutral society 
individuals will, ex ante, unanimously prefer total reform to no reform.
This changes as soon as CE is characterised by risk averse individuals taking entrepre­
neurial jobs. Then CE becomes subject to the inefficiencies described in the previous sec­
tion. Increases in risk aversion tend to amplify these inefficiencies. C, meanwhile, 
remains unaffected by the changes in risk attitudes. As the following corollary shows, 
there comes a point where individuals prefer no reform to total reform.
Corollary 4.3: An overall increase in society's risk aversion leads to an increase in the 
proportion o f individuals preferring no reform to total r^orm. For a sufficiently risk 
averse society this proportion exceeds 0.5 (i.e., a majority prefers no reform) and even­
tually reaches l , for infinite risk aversion.
D emonstration of Corollary 4.3: Since C is unaffected by changes in risk attitudes, 
the corollary follows directly firom result 4.7. □
Another interesting result regards the political stability of reform. The historical experi­
ence from the recent reforms in formerly collectivist economies has shown that the atti­
tude of a majority towards reforms may change dramatically after the reforms are 
enacted. In many countries the reforming governments were voted out of office at the 
first elections after the reforms. As the following result shows, this phenomenon can be 
explained within this framework.
Result 4.8: It is possible (namely under the conditions given in the demonstration) that 
a majority o f individuals ex ante prefer total reform to no reform, even if the reform 
makes a majority o f individuals worse-off, ex post.
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D em o n str a tio n  o f  Result  4.8: Define the median voter m in the following way: As 
the wage w falls from ©o towards 0 , more and more individuals will choose to become 
entrepreneurs. Then, there exists a wage level
and an individual m, such as:
.^ W ) (48)
and
+ = I  . (49)
With this definition of m, for a majority of individuals to ex ante prefer total reform to no 
reform it is necessary and sufficient that
• (50)
Now, notice that if (50) holds, if m is a worker and if wq<Wc^, then the result cannot be 
explained, since a majority of individuals will benefit from the reform. Thus, for a major­
ity to suffer from reform, it is necessary that m be an entrepreneur. The remainder of this 
demonstration derives two different conditions under which the result holds:
(i) Suppose that (50) holds, that m is an entrepreneur and that If also the con­
dition i~^hce~^ IjCE'^^hce^ ^ h o l d s  (i.e., a majority of the 
population is composed of either unlucky entrepreneurs or workers), then the result 
holds, since ex post all workers are worse off (as and will form a majority
together with the unlucky entrepreneurs (who receive zero income). The condition can be 
simplified to Qc£<0^.
(ii) Suppose that (50) holds, that m is an entrepreneur and that wç>wc£. If also the con­
dition holds (i.e., a majority of the population is composed 
of unlucky entrepreneurs), then the result clearly holds. □
This simple result can be discussed in the light of Fernandez and Rodrik (1991). In their 
paper, they show that a large sector where a majority of people may lose after some
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reforms (opening the borders to trade in their case) may be enough to prevent any reform, 
although a majority of the population would gain from the reform. Here, the argument is 
reversed. Although a majority will lose, there can be a majority of people willing to take 
the gamble of the market economy.
In any case, reforms wiU be primarily supported by potential entrepreneurs since they are 
the ones who take advantage of the competitive institutions, in case somebody should 
gain from reforms. So it is no surprise that supporters of change tend to be found among 
individuals with low risk aversion and high ability.
4.7 Gradual reform and dual economy
So far, I have considered the collectivist and the competitive institutions separately. 
Clearly, these two allocation mechanisms can coexist with a fraction of the population 
being employed in the collectivist sector and the remainder in the competitive sector. 
Such a dual economy represents a natural view of partial or gradual reforms. I will inter­
pret the dual economy equilibrium (DE) defined below, the outcome of gradual 
reform. Individuals can make a free choice to work either in the collectivist or in the com­
petitive sector and society decides the freedom of this choice to individuals. The new 
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FIGURE 4.4: The sequence of events in the dual economy.
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Definition 4,2: A Dual Economy Equilibrium (DE) is a competitive wage w^^, a collec­
tivist wage W5 and partitions of the sets o f talented and untalented individuals in compet­
itive sector workers competitive sector entrepreneurs Ttde» collectivist sector 
workers and managers 'Lj (for T-Hf.), such that:
(i) each entrepreneur in the competitive sector demands workers such as to max­
imise profits, whereby she takes the wage rate in the competitive sector as given, i.e.,
' ^ D E ^  -  ^ D E  ; (51)
(a) labour supply equals labour demand in the competitive sector, i.e.,
^ ^HDE ~  ^LDE ~  ^HDE ^LDE^ ^DE  ’ (^2)
where Ztde T=HJ^) denote the proportions of type T individuals in the total popula­
tion choosing to be entrepreneurs and Oj (for T=Hf,) denote the proportions o fT  indi­
viduals in the collectivist sector;
(Hi) individuals make their sectoral and occupational choices such as to maximise their 
expected utility, i.e., for T=HJ^ it must be the case that
V ( r , Tirp, RÇk)) ^ max [  ^ g Ty ; (53)
Wj^^>max{w^,v(rj^^,Ttj ,R(k)) ' \  =» /:e  Ay , (54)
and
> max [ V ( r , TCy, R(k)) ] => k g 2y y (55)
where r^^ denotes entrepreneurial income.
(iv) When they are indifferent between the two sectors, individuals choose randomly 
(i.e., independently o f their type).
(v) is chosen such a to be maximised, subject to (CJ  ^+ Gy) < , where G5
denotes total output of the collectivist sector.
(vi) is chosen such as to maximise G^, given o  = c ^  +Op.
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This definition formalises the idea of gradual reform where individuals have the choice 
to work either in the collectivist sector or in the competitive sector (see part (iii)). Each 
of these two sectors, works essentially in the same way as the corresponding pure econ­
omies. This is expressed in parts (i) to (iii), for the competitive institutions, and in parts
(v) and (vi), for the collectivist institutions. Only part (iv) is new. It states that if an indi­
vidual is indifferent between the two sectors, her choice will be unbiased, i.e., independ­
ent of her type. I am now in the position to demonstrate that the outcome of partial reform 
as captured by definition 4.2 is uniquely determined.
Result 4.9: DE exists and is unique.
D em o n str a tio n  of  Result  4.9: DE is a 7-tuple (}^s>^s>^sh>^sl»^de>^hde>^lde^ 
satisfying definition 4.2.1 first take , and £5 as given, and show that the other five var­
iables are uniquely determined by parts (i) to (iv) of definition 4.2. From part (iii), it must 
be that WDg=wg. (Otherwise, comer solution which is unique from discussions in sec­
tions 4.4 and 4.5.) Let be defined by
=  m a x [ W s y V { r ^ ^ { w ^ \ n f j , k f j p E ) ^  » ( 56)
and k^DE by
= max [  , v(^  (^S * (5^)
Then, by the monotonicity of v(.) regarding the equilibrium wage, it follows that kf^p^
and kppp are uniquely determined. Therefore, e//c£ and £/^£ are also unique. From 
result 4.3, this means that i-G., employment in the competitive
sector, is unique. This, in turn, determines (o^+c^), i.e., employment in the collectivist 
sector, uniquely from
 ^ H ^ ~ ^^ HDE L^DE^  ^DE (^D ^HDE ^LDE^  * (5^)
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Given the unbiasedness assumption made in part (iv) of definition 4.2, the proportion of 
H relative to L types is the same in the collectivist sector as among the competitive sector 
workers, such that CT// and are unique.
I have now established that for any given pair the remaining variables are
uniquely determined. Then, from part (vi) of definition 4.2, it follows that is unique 
from the maximisation. Similarly, from part (v), it follows that Wg is unique from the 
maximisation. □
The definition of DE formalises the outcome of gradual reform. Individuals are free to 
choose the sector they want to work in and, within the competitive sector, they can also 
choose their occupation. In general, these choices lead to a DE with some individuals in 
each sector. But there is also the possibilities of DE coinciding with either CE or C. The 
former, I would call "spontaneous big bang", the latter "conservative society". The fol­
lowing paragraphs and the example given below, show that these two outcomes are actu­
ally possible.
If wq<wce, then this means that at least some individuals must have moved to the com­
petitive sector. As more talented individuals tend to become entrepreneurs (see result 
4.3), proportionally more talented individuals will be in the competitive sector and both 
average managerial ability and output per worker in the collectivist sector must fall, i.e., 
C5'jy/(c5'^ +cy^ )=(x.j<(x and
G^(e^)
= [7c  ^ (7 -  a^) ] ( i  -  Y)  ^  ^Y  ^ - (59)
But this, in turn, means that even more individuals may leave the collectivist sector until 
all individuals are employed in the competitive sector. This is the outcome I call a 
"spontaneous big bang".
Now, consider the case wq>wce and yirQE{wQ),%uJi')<wc. In this case, clearly no-one 
leaves the collectivist sector, and DE coincides with C. This is the outcome I call the 
"conservative society".
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Next, consider the case wq>Wc£ and y^{rQ^{wc),%u^')>wc, In this case, a competitive 
sector develops. It is such that and again the possibility of "spontaneous big
bang" arises. This is illustrated in the following example.
Example: Suppose y=05, %=0 and 7T//=7 . From this it follows that and
wq=oJ4. Suppose risk attitudes are such that a fraction p of the population is risk neutral 
and (l~p) are infinitely risk averse. This implies that in CE the wage will be
K  pa. 1
^ c e = 2 V T ^ )  ^ “ ^ 2 ’
which means that Moreover, all risk neutral H-types become entrepreneurs, if
. <«)
which always holds, and
aJJj-p)  
1 - p a0C5 = , . (62)
One can check that for a=0.5 and p=0.11, it follows that which is the sit­
uation discussed above, leading to a "spontaneous big bang". □
What can be said about society's choice between total reform, gradual reform and no 
reform through majority voting? As shown above, choosing between C and CE a major­
ity vote may go either way (corollary 4.3), and if CE is chosen, ex post a majority may 
regret it (result 4.8). W t^h the possibility of gradual reform, the social choice is enriched 
substantially, unless, DE coincides either with C or with CE. In particular, it is a priori 
possible that majority voting is intransitive. The following result and corollary, however, 
exclude this possibility.
Result 4.10: DE is never preferred by a majority to both CE and C.
D emonstration of Result 4.10: Suppose that DE does not coincide with either CE 
or C. (Otherwise, the result is not meaningful.) It is easy to show that the median voter m.
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as defined in the demonstration of result 4.8, is always part of the winning majority (she 
is, actually, the only pivotal voter in the society). Notice also that, if DE is different from 
both CE and C, equilibrium wages are ranked as follows:
^  ^ D E  ~  ^ C E  •
The last inequality implies that rcE^r^E' these facts in mind, the rest of the demon­
stration is very simple: if m is a worker in DE, then she prefers C to DE. If m is an entre­
preneur in DE, she may prefer DE to C, but always prefers CE to DE. □
This result shows how the conflict of interest (or class struggle) results in a polarisation 
of political decisions. I believe that it helps to understand why in many cases - particu­
larly in some former Soviet Republics - gradual reformers tended to lose either to the rad­
ical reformers or to the conservatives. There are basically only two ways how moderate 
reform can be a politically stable outcome in the transition process. Either the democratic 
choice in the society is restricted by some form of dictate, in which case a majority may 
opt for gradual reform as opposed to no reform. The second way is if, after total reform 
has been realised and a majority of the population is made worse-off (see result 4.8 and 
corollary 4.5, below), they may want to return to a collectivist system. By this time, how­
ever, C may not be economically feasible any more, so that they would accept the DE as 
a substitute.
Corollary 4.4: Majority rule is always transitive regarding the choice between DE, CE 
and no reform.
D emonstration of Corollary 4.4: There are two orderings which violate transi­
tivity, namely
(i) DE CE ^  DE , and
(ii) DE ^  >
where stands for "is preferred by a majority to". But result 4.10 implies that these 
two orderings are impossible. □
This result is important in two ways. Firstly, it makes clear that result 4.8, above, and cor­
ollary 4.5 below, i.e., the finding that a majority of voters may regret the decision taken
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by a majority in an earlier vote, are not driven by intransitivity, but by the gap between 
prospects and realisations. Secondly, the transitivity result improves the descriptive rele­
vance of the analysis. Clearly, the results concerning the politics of transition (result 4.8 
and corollaries 4.3 and 4.5) would not be very interesting if the political outcome was 
indeterminate.
The next question raised by the possibility of a dual economy equilibrium is whether it 
eliminates the possibility of society making the "wrong" choice in the sense of result 4.8. 
In other words, is it still possible that society chooses either total or gradual reform, 
although it will make a majority of the population worse-off? In fact, result 4.11 shows 
that the answer to this question is positive.
Corollary 4.5: It is possible that a majority o f individuals ex ante prefers either gradual 
or total reform to no reform, even if the reform makes a majority of individuals worse off, 
ex post.
D emonstration of Corollary 4.5: As long as only the dual economy coincides with 
the competitive economy, the corollary coincides with result 4.8. If the dual economy is 
distinct from both the competitive and the collectivist economy, it suffices to observe that
^  (  ''c E  » ( 6 4 )
and
05 > ^hde^h ^LDE^ L • (65)
Equation (64) states that the median voter is better-off under the dual economy. There is 
a majority who regrets ex-post if there is a majority composed of workers and unlucky 
entrepreneurs, as required by (65). □
4.8 Conclusion
The prototype economy analysed in this paper builds on the standard Arrow-Debreu 
framework. 7 only assume that output and employment in private firms are not observa­
ble by outsiders. Thus, insurance markets will be missing in the competitive economy.
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There is no way a private entrepreneur can be insured against her low ability or bad luck. 
So the potential productive inefficiency of the competitive economy stems from risk 
aversion. There is one alternative institution to the market: a fixed sharing rule can pro­
vide full insurance against individual income risks. But in that case, managers have no 
incentive to reveal their type or to adjust employment levels to plant productivity. More­
over, managers have no incentive to reveal their luck so that some units keep employing 
labour, although they are unproductive. This results in inefficient allocations of both tal­
ent and labour. The comparison between these two institutions is not trivial. Either one 
can be better.
As a special case of a collectivist institution, consider a benevolent uninformed central 
planner. Due to imperfect information, the central planner cannot do better than the out­
come described in section 4.4. The allocation of talent and labour cannot be optimal in 
such a centrally planned economy. Competitive institutions partly solve this problem, but 
only at the cost of risk bearing. Consequently, the competitive economy is characterised 
by a shortage of entrepreneurs and an inefficient (though less inefficient) allocation of 
talent. The first part of this chapter has compared these two second-best outcomes.
In the second part of this chapter, I have used this framework to replicate some stylised 
facts of transitional economies. First, despite the possibility of a vote in favour of 
reforms, some countries are still governed according to the old rules, often by the old rul­
ers. It may simply be that the majority of the population is better-off under a collectivist 
system than with a market economy, at least in the short-run. The second crucial fact is 
that the political debate in many countries has become polarised on the pro reform/anti 
reform issue. Moderate options vanished in most countries. It can be understood within 
our model, since the dual economy is nobody’s first choice (result 4.10). The model actu­
ally highlights the antagonism between workers and entrepreneurs. Yet it may be that 
workers are better-off with competitive institutions. If not, they prefer the collectivist 
organisation, whereas entrepreneurs enjoy the highest profits with competitive institu­
tions.
Result 4.10 is very different from the conclusions derived in Dewatripont and Roland 
(1992a and b) and Roland (1994). They emphasise the virtues of gradual reform and 
democracy. In Dewatripont and Roland (1992b), for example, the authors develop a 
model with benevolent (i.e. social surplus maximising), agenda-setting government 
which faces democratic constraints. In their model (denoted D-R), the social cost of tran­
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sition to a market economy is not based on risk bearing but on the cost of compensating 
the losers. They show that the benefits of gradualism (=less costly transfers needed) rel­
ative to a "big bang" may exceed its costs (=slower transition). This is in contrast to result 
4.10 which states that gradual reform is unlikely to be the outcome of a democratic proc­
ess of transition.
The second main result of D-R concerns the problem of implementing an efficiency- 
enhancing reform which intertemporally hurts a majority of voters. The authors argue 
that the government could in large part circumvent the political constraints by designing 
an appropriate gradual reform. My result 4.8 and corollary 4.5 state a similar result with­
out, however, relying on the assumption that the reforms are efficiency-enhancing. This 
means that the democratic process may generate reforms, even when they are not effi­
ciency-enhancing.
There are several differences which explain the different results of D-R compared to 
mine. First, democratic institutions are viewed differently: D-R assume a social surplus 
maximising agenda-setter while I assume direct democracy. Second, the entire analysis 
of D-R relies on the assumption that the government can implement income transfers (at 
a cost), while in my model such transfers are not feasible (mainly because winners and 
losers are not known to others). This is the crucial difference between the two papers. But 
there other important differences. While D-R simply assume that the market economy is 
more productive than the pre-reform economy, I derive the productivities of the two sys­
tems endogenously, within a unified framework based on identical economic fundamen­
tals. Finally, my model describes more accurately an economy-wide reform (=transition) 
within a general equilibrium framework, while D-R’s partial equilibrium model captures 
rather a sectoral structural adjustment of the type currently occurring in some sectors in 
Western market economies.
The second antagonism analysed in this chapter concerns winners and losers. Among the 
losers of transition, one can find many unlucky entrepreneurs. This explains why in so 
many transition countries a majority of people voted initially in favour of reforms, 
whereas a new majority formed ex-post voting for (ex-)communist politicians. If one 
considers that the first reforms have some degree of irreversibility, the dual economy 
may become a viable political alternative. Note also that a dual economy, is more likely 
to be found in countries where reforms where not democratically decided. China and 
Vietnam offer examples of countries where still a significant collectivist sector survives
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despite the presence of some alternative highly competitive institutions. It can also be the 
case, that even though total reform was never really enacted, it occurred due to the open­
ing of a competitive sector. Russia can be seen as an example of such a situation.
\tiewed after a longer period of experience, I would claim that my results seem to better 
explain the historic events in transition countries than D-R. While D-R seemed to be wor­
ried, at the time, that reforms in some Eastern European countries may not take place 
"because the move towards democracy is not yet credible or solid enough" (p. 300), my 
analysis may shed some light on the reasons why the "first generation" of radical reform­
ers in most cases are now losing the second round of democratic elections to the reform- 
critics. At the same time China seems to be on a steady (gradual) reform path, again 
seemingly contradicting D-R’s claim that "the power monopoly of the nomenclatura 
must be toppled in order to fully make the transition to a market economy" (p. 300).
Of course, my model remains extremely mdimentary and puts the emphasis only on a 
few aspects of the transition process. Among possible extensions, one could think of 
introducing aggregate risk, since it is difficult to argue that macro-economic risk would 
be negligible during transition. Moreover, the simplifying view of the labour market 
ignores unemployment. It would also be desirable to relax the extreme assumption of 
non-observability. Imperfect observability should lead to the possibility of imperfect 
insurance in the competitive sector. Grossman, Hart and Maskin (1983) present a model 
where partial insurance is offered to entrepreneurs contingent on the amount of labour 
they hire.
The point which most deserves further research is perhaps the intrinsically dynamic 
aspect of the transition process. The comparison of the two systems starting fi"om the col­
lectivist economy may not be favourable to the competitive institutions. The main idea is 
that risks, especially the aggregate ones, are much higher at the beginning of the process. 
Moreover, a market economy, starting fi*om scratch has to overcome high transaction 
costs. )^tithin the model, one could assume that individuals know their type with some 
uncertainty. It is only after a few years that they leam their type more precisely. This 
intertemporal trade-off should be embodied in the model since it has been argued that 
things should become worse before they improve.
To consider this argument properly, one would probably need to add some Schumpete­
rian aspects to the Knightian theory of entrepreneurship. These two views of entrepre­
neurship, often presented as antagonistic may complement each other to some extent.
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The Knightian features are probably more static in nature, whereas Schumpeterian argu­
ments are intrinsically dynamic.
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